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Testimonial Exclusions and Religious
Freedom in Early America
JUD CAMPBELL
At the end of his presidency, George Washington published a letter reflect-
ing on the character of the nascent American republic. Later known as his
Farewell Address, the letter famously warned against the dangers of
domestic political parties and entangling foreign alliances. In addition,
Washington extolled the foundations of a virtuous citizenry: “Of all the
dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity,” he proclaimed,
“Religion and morality are indispensable supports.”1 Washington then
offered an example: “Let it simply be asked where is the security for prop-
erty, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the
oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in Courts of Justice?”2
For his eighteenth-century audience, Washington’s reference to the reli-
gious content of oaths was straightforward. Testimony under oath could be
trusted because witnesses put their souls on the line. As William
Law and History Review May 2019, Vol. 37, No. 2
© the American Society for Legal History, Inc. 2019
doi:10.1017/S0738248018000482
Jud Campbell is an assistant professor at the University of Richmond School of
Law. The author thanks Hamilton Bryson, Christian Burset, Nathan Chapman,
George Fisher, Amalia Kessler, Michael McConnell, Jack Rakove, Norm
Spaulding, Law and History Review’s anonymous reviewers, and participants in
the Berkeley Legal History Workshop and the Law & Religion Roundtable for
helpful suggestions. The author also thanks Michael Bosson, Jennifer Hadley,
Guy Holborn, Sonia Moss, Tom Savini, and Betsy Spekke for their archival
assistance.
1. John C. Patrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington: From the Original
Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, 39 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1931–44), 35:229.
2. Ibid. Many of the virtues discussed in Washington’s letter, including religion, were
contrasts to events unfolding in France.
Blackstone explained in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, “The
belief in a future state of rewards and punishments, the entertaining just
ideas of moral attributes of the supreme Being, and a firm persuasion
that he superintends and will finally compensate every action in human
life . . . are the ground foundations of all judicial oaths.”3 Consequently,
prospective witnesses who did not believe in divine punishment were
barred from testifying—or, in legal parlance, declared “incompetent” to
testify.
Gradually at first, and then with growing speed, the theological under-
pinnings of oath taking eroded across the United States in the early nine-
teenth century. Fifty years after Washington’s Farewell Address, the
Virginia General Court ruled that the commonwealth’s constitutional guar-
antee of religious freedom had displaced the outdated doctrine. “The pro-
gress of science and civilization, and the demands of commerce,” the court
declared, “have led to a relaxation of the [common-law incompetency]
rule.”4 Ten years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court announced
that barring witnesses because of their disbelief in hell was “wholly repug-
nant to the tolerant and enlightened spirit of our institutions and of the age
in which we live.”5 And these two states were late converts to what had
become a nationwide repudiation of excluding witnesses because of their
disbelief in hell. A rule thought essential a half-century earlier had become
fundamentally at odds with legal orthodoxy.
The story of this transition illuminates and weaves together several
important strands of nineteenth-century social and legal history. Judicial
decisions are an obvious centerpiece in this narrative, but the most impor-
tant catalysts of nineteenth-century reforms, it turns out, had little to do
with particular courtroom disputes. Instead, evidence rules came into esca-
lating conflict with American religion, especially after a liberal offshoot of
Calvinism began rejecting the existence of hell. The development and rapid
growth of this sect, known as Universalism, put tremendous strain on exist-
ing law. Not only did the common-law rule bar testimony from otherwise
trustworthy witnesses to crimes, wills, and contracts; it imposed a civil dis-
ability on an entire group of Christians because of their interpretation of the
testimony of Jesus.
By prevailing Founding Era standards, being unable to testify did not
impede or punish Universalists’ exercise of religion, thus allowing the
common-law rule to survive an initial volley of legal challenges. But
3. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1765–69), 4:44.
4. Perry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 645, 646 (1846).
5. Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 25, 31 (1856).
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Americans are renowned for waging political contests on constitutional ter-
rain, reshaping constitutional meaning as they go. As Universalism grew,
constitutional arguments against the restrictive competency rule evolved,
and gained salience. In particular, critics began to promote evidentiary
reform by invoking a different conception of free exercise: one that rejected
any governmental discrimination on the basis of religion, irrespective of
whether the government was actually impeding a person’s exercise of reli-
gion. And this debate spilled well beyond the courtroom doors, command-
ing substantial attention in newspaper columns, law journals and treatises,
religious magazines, legislative sessions, and state constitutional conven-
tions. The shift away from religion-based oaths was therefore important
to the development of a neutrality-based view of religious liberty and,
more generally, an egalitarian conception of civil privileges.
The early nineteenth-century transformation in religion-based compe-
tency rules was one of the most prominent American legal developments
of the era, but it is only vaguely appreciated in the existing literature.
Historians have observed a lessened “confidence in the power of the
oath to assure the legitimacy of verdicts,”6 and that “the movement from
oath-based to cross-examination-based theories of safeguard in the law
of evidence” was premised on “a changed view of what promotes verac-
ity.”7 But these brief statements—clearly accurate descriptions of
wide-ranging transitions in social and legal views—do not purport to
explain how changes in religion-based competency rules occurred, nor
do they account for the rich debates regarding religious liberty that played
a central role in that history. Current scholarship also includes elemental
errors suggesting a broad lack of understanding of the timing and mechan-
ics of early nineteenth-century competency reforms.8 And nearly all studies
addressing this topic have focused on published appellate decisions,
describing a doctrinal shift on the bench without illuminating the vibrant
reform efforts taking place out of court.9
6. George Fisher, “The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector,” Yale Law Journal 107 (1997): 661.
7. John H. Langbein, Renée Lettow Lerner, and Bruce P. Smith, History of the Common
Law: The Development of the Anglo-American Legal Tradition (New York: Aspen
Publishers, 2009), 453.
8. See, for example, notes 9 and 107.
9. For a concise summary of the doctrinal shift, see Steven K. Green, The Second
Disestablishment: Church and State in Nineteenth-Century America (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 178–82, 214–18. Green, however, does not provide evidence to
defend his statement that “the effect of the traditional rule requiring a belief in God and
in future punishment had been to exclude many Universalists, Catholics, Jews, adherents
of other faiths, and skeptics from testifying in court or entering into legal or commercial
arrangements requiring an oath.” Ibid., 214. The “traditional rule,” as will be discussed,
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In one of the few exceptions, Ronald Formisano and Stephen Pickering
observe “an evolution toward the more inclusive standard” that allowed
testimony from all those who believed in divine punishment, regardless
of whether they believed that such punishment would occur after
death.10 Yet the primary thesis for Formisano and Pickering is the “reten-
tion of the traditional Christian tests of witness competency” in the United
States, thus demonstrating “how ‘authority’ and ‘orthodoxy’ kept their
hold on courtroom practice.”11 They do not try to explain why competency
rules shifted so dramatically in the first half of the nineteenth century.12
Beyond its impact on religious liberty, the decline in religion-based
competency rules also played a pivotal role in the history of American evi-
dence law. Evidence law scholars have devoted significant attention both to
the eighteenth century and to the middle of the nineteenth century, but have
given little notice to the interlude.13 Yet this largely unexplored period was
seminal in the development of modern evidence law principles. Disputes
over religion-based competency rules, it turns out, prompted the first wide-
spread reassessment of the foundational premises of American evidence
law.
was formulated in the eighteenth century to allow testimony from Jewish and other
non-Protestant witnesses. See Part I.A.
10. Ronald P. Formisano and Stephen Pickering, “The Christian Nation Debate and
Witness Competency,” Journal of the Early Republic 29 (2009): 229. Christopher Grasso
nicely captures parts of this shift in a brief comparison of an 1803 case with an 1836 journal
article. See Christopher Grasso, “The Boundaries of Toleration and Tolerance: Religious
Infidelity in the Early American Republic,” in The First Prejudice: Religious Tolerance
and Intolerance in Early America, ed. Chris Beneke and Christopher S. Grenda
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 286, 292–95.
11. Formisano and Pickering, “The Christian Nation Debate,” 229. See also ibid., 232
(“Religious tests for witnesses, though diminishing in frequency, persisted well through
the nineteenth century”). Older contributions to the literature are almost purely doctrinal
and descriptive, making little effort to explain how and why competency rules evolved.
See, for example, Thomas Raeburn White, “Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and Their
Effect upon the Competency of Witnesses,” American Law Register 51 (1903): 373–446.
12. Indeed, their principal question—whether the United States was a “Christian
nation”—is quite distinct from my inquiry. Similarly, a Connecticut case study focuses
mostly on questions of disestablishment. See Carol Weisbroad, “On Evidences and
Intentions: ‘The More Proof, the More Doubt,’” Connecticut Law Review 18 (1986): 803.
13. The few exceptions do not delve into religion-based competency cases. See, for exam-
ple, Renée Lettow Lerner, “The Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent
Judge,” William and Mary Law Review 42 (2000): 195–264; and John Fabian Witt,
“Making the Fifth: The Constitutionalization of American Self-Incrimination Doctrine,
1791–1903,” Texas Law Review 77 (1999): 825–922. Witt briefly discusses religion-based
rules.
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The evidence law facet of this story raises difficult questions about
motives and causes. As nineteenth-century reformers pushed to dismantle
religion-based evidentiary rules, they presented a broader challenge to the
prevailing system of rigid competency requirements. The notion that juries
could be used as capable fact finders was a key facet of this agenda. But
reformers often employed jury-based rhetoric only when their other argu-
ments were failing. For the most part, then, the sweeping jury-based rhe-
toric of reformers was not matched by a strongly held devotion to
wide-ranging evidence liberalization. By and large, the people who most
wanted Universalists to be able to testify in court apparently lacked the
political will to pursue a broader agenda of legal reform.
Nonetheless, the attacks made on religion-based competency rules in the
second quarter of the nineteenth century seem to have affected, or at least
reflected, how many Americans thought about evidence law. Subsequent
discussions about whether atheists should be allowed to testify, for exam-
ple, are replete with the same rhetorical strategy, relying heavily on the
capacity of juries to uncover the truth. Similar language re-emerged in
the 1850s and 1860s when a combination of political forces led to an effort
to dismantle both Southern competency rules preventing blacks from tes-
tifying and Northern competency rules barring the testimony of witnesses
(including parties) who had personal interests in the outcomes of cases.
The history of the demise of religion-based competency rules thus illumi-
nates not only a lasting shift in views about religious freedom but also the
emergence of a broader, and repeatedly successful, rhetorical strategy of
evidentiary reform.
I. Common Law
English law has a long history of reliance on oaths. Following the demise
of trials by ordeal, judges turned to juries to determine guilt or innocence in
criminal trials.14 Originally, juries seem to have made decisions mostly
using prior knowledge, but by the early fourteenth century, witnesses
were more regularly being called into court.15 Each witness and juror
14. Fisher, “The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector,” 585–90. Trials by ordeal ended rather
quickly after the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. Ibid., 585–86; and James
Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 126. Juries have existed since at least the
twelfth century, but they initially decided only whether individuals should face an ordeal.
Whitman, Origins of Reasonable Doubt, 133–38.
15. The prevalence of witness testimony in the thirteenth century is unclear. See
Fisher, “The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector,” 594 n.51. Fisher points out that criminal juries
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swore an oath, providing putative assurance that witnesses would speak the
truth and that jurors would faithfully evaluate the evidence. Not everyone,
however, was allowed to be a witness. Plaintiffs, defendants, financially
interested parties, criminals, and “infidels” were among the many classes
declared “incompetent” to testify.16
By the eighteenth century, witness-competency rules served a range of
functions in the English legal system. Perhaps most importantly, strict
competency requirements reduced the amount of conflicting testimony,
helping to maintain the sanctity of oaths and, in turn, the legitimacy of
the judicial system. Because oaths were meant to ensure the veracity of evi-
dence, routine testimonial conflicts would have been deeply problematic,
exposing the extent to which human judgment rather than abstract truth
determined outcomes.17 Additionally, as James Whitman argues, the com-
mon law responded to concerns that jurors put their own souls at risk.18
Many interpreted the Biblical injunction “Judge not, that ye be not judged”
as a warning against unjust condemnation.19 Given this concern, jurors
faced with conflicting evidence were more likely to find defendants not
guilty. Strict competency rules therefore helped judicial elites avoid this
potential barrier to obtaining guilty verdicts.20
In the early seventeenth century, the common law prohibited
non-Christian “infidels” from testifying.21 The rule apparently existed for
did not necessarily mimic civil juries, “which almost certainly were self-informing.” Ibid.,
593.
16. The general rule against party testimony was subject to some exceptions. See, for
example, Zephaniah Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut, 2 vols.
(Windham, CT: John Byrne, 1795–96), 2:238, 242. For a fascinating exploration of
common-law treatment of whether children could testify, see Holly Brewer, By Birth or
Consent: Children, Law, and the Anglo-American Revolution in Authority (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 155–74. The predominant obstacle to children’s
testimony in the late eighteenth century was their inability to appreciate the nature of an oath.
Ibid., 158–60.
17. Fisher, “The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector,” 590; and Charles Donahue, Jr., “Proof by
Witnesses in the Church Courts of Medieval England: An Imperfect Reception of the
Learned Law,” in On the Laws and Customs of England: Essays in Honor of Samuel
E. Thorne, ed. Morris S. Arnold, Thomas A. Green, Sally A. Scully, and Stephen D.
White (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 131.
18. Whitman, Origins of Reasonable Doubt, 186–92.
19. Matthew 7:1 (King James). See also Luke 6:37 (King James).
20. Similarly, strict competency rules helped shield witnesses from facing eternal damna-
tion if they lied based on their temporal interests in the outcome of a case. On the risks faced
by witnesses, see Whitman, Origins of Reasonable Doubt, ch. 3 and 4. More cynically, com-
petency determinations increased judicial control over trials.
21. As Lord Chief Justice Edward Coke explained in his Institutes of the Laws of
England, “An Oath is an affirmation or denyal by any Christian of any thing lawfull and
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two reasons, neither of which was immediately aimed at ensuring the accu-
racy of testimony. First, England did not tolerate religious dissent, and evi-
dence rules reflected this hostile attitude toward other faiths, including
Judaism and Roman Catholicism.22 Second, the particular form of
English oath taking was explicitly Christian, with each witness swearing
while he “toucheth with his hand some part of the holy Scripture.”23
Accordingly, non-Christians could not swear an English oath.
Once Judaism was lawful in England, however, the common law slowly
adapted. At first, the rigidity of perjury rules (which required proof that the
witness had sworn on the Bible) impeded Jewish oath taking.24 In cases of
necessity, however, English courts began to accept Jewish testimony. As
Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale explained, “altho the regular oath, as it
is allowd by the laws of England, is tactis sacrosanctis Dei evangeliis,
which supposeth a man to be a christian, yet in cases of necessity, as in
forein contracts between merchant and merchant, which are many times
transacted by Jewish brokers, the testimony of a Jew tacto libro legis
Mosaicæ is not to be rejected, and is used, as I have been informed,
among all nations.”25
Under Hale’s interpretation, the English oath remained a conventionally
Christian instrument, but it was available to others by the necessity of for-
eign trade. This view was expanded upon in the 1744–45 English chancery
decision of Omichund v. Barker.26 Lingering ambiguities in the Omichund
honest, . . . calling Almighty God to witness that his testimony is true.” Edward Coke, The
Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning High Treason, and other
Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal Causes, 4th ed. (London: A Crooke et al., 1669), 165.
22. Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398 (K.B. 1608) (“All infidels are in law perpetui
inimici; for between them, as with the devils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there
is perpetual hostility”). Along similar lines, Virginia disallowed testimony from “Popish
recusants convict,” who were “convicted in a court of law of not attending the service of
the church of England.” Blackstone, Commentaries, 4:56–57; see Edward I. Devitt,
“Catholics in Colonial Virginia,” in The American Catholic Historical Researches 25
(1908): 354; and Gerald P. Fogarty, Commonwealth Catholicism: A History of the
Catholic Church in Virginia (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001),
17–19.
23. Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, 165.
24. See F. Ashe Lincoln, “The Non-Christian Oath in English Law,” The Jewish
Historical Society of England: Transactions 16 (1952): 73–75.
25. Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronæ: The History of the Pleas of the Crown, 2
vols. (London: E. Nutt et al., 1736), 2:279.
26. Omichund v. Barker, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 397 (High Ct. Ch. 1744/5). This report was pub-
lished as A General Abridgment of Cases in Equity Argued and Adjudged in the High Court
of Chancery, 2 vols. (London: Henry Lintot, 1756). Counsel made oral arguments in
November 1744, and the justices issued opinions 3 months later on February 23, 1744/5.
Until September 1752, England used the Julian calendar, with year changes taking place
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opinions later spurred significant debate in American courts, and the case
therefore deserves close attention.
A. Omichund v. Barker
The dispute in Omichund began when Hugh Barker,27 an employee of the
East India Company and territorial governor, refused to pay a debt of more
than 60,000 rupees28 to an extraordinarily wealthy local merchant named
Amirchand (typically listed as Omichund or Omychund in contemporary
British records).29 When Amirchand filed suit in Calcutta, Barker quickly
absconded on a ship for Europe but died on the journey.
Seeking recovery of the debt, Amirchand’s lawyers in England sued
Barker’s estate in chancery court. Barker’s executor then filed a cross-claim
requiring a sworn answer. Because Amirchand was not a Christian and
therefore could not swear on the Bible, “a Commission went to take his
Answer in that Manner in which he was able to give it.”30 While in
India, the commission also took depositions from several Christian and
Hindu witnesses.
When the commission returned to England, Amirchand’s lawyers sought
to file the answer and to introduce the Hindu witnesses’ depositions as evi-
dence, but the attorney for Barker’s estate, John Tracy Atkyns, objected to
the competency of these deponents on account of their religious beliefs.
Atkyns cited Coke for the proposition that only Christians could swear
an oath.31 Atkyns insisted that the “ignorant, . . . absurd and ridiculous”
in March. For the period between January and March, eighteenth-century Americans often
noted both years using a comma, dash, or space to separate the years.
27. Identification of Barker’s first name comes from Kirti N. Chaudhuri, The Trading
World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660–1760 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1978), 357.
28. The complaint “was brought to have a satisfaction for 67,955 rupees, amounting to
about 7,600 £ English money, from the estate of the late Mr. Barker.” 1 Atk. 21. In modern
purchasing power, that sum would be well over £1,000,000.
29. See Kumkum Chatterjee, “Trade and Darbar Politics in the Bengal Subah, 1733–
1757,” Modern Asian Studies 26 (1992): 243–71; Somendra C. Nandy, “Amir Chand (d.
1758),” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. Henry Colin Gray Matthew and
Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
30. Omichund, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 398.
31. Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 23, 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (High Ct. Ch. 1744/5). This
report was published as John Tracy Atkyns, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in
the High Court of Chancery in the Time of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, 3 vols. (London:
J. Worrall & W. Sandby, 1765–68).
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religious principles of the Hindu witnesses were insufficient for them to
comprehend the sanctity of an oath.32
Because of Amirchand’s financial and political power and the com-
mercial importance of allowing non-Christians—particularly Jewish mer-
chants—to testify in English courts, the case garnered substantial
attention. When the dispute reached the High Court of Chancery, Lord
Chancellor Philip York, First Earl of Hardwicke, asked for the assistance
of three of the country’s most eminent jurists: the Lord Chief Justice of
England and Wales, the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common
Pleas, and the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer.33 And among the law-
yers arguing on behalf of Amirchand were two of England’s leading jurists,
Attorney General Dudley Ryder and Solicitor General William Murray,
soon to become the famous Earl of Mansfield.34
In his argument, Ryder acknowledged Coke’s statement about oaths but
claimed that the exigencies of foreign commerce necessitated allowing
Hindu testimony: “[T]rade requires it, policy requires it, and in dealings
of this kind it is of infinite consequence, there should not be a failure of
justice.”35 Murray articulated an even more liberal rule of evidence.
Looking to British history and the experience of other countries, including
India, Murray argued that an “oath must be always understood according
to the belief of the person who takes it.”36 Cognizant of the commercial
consequences of excluding Hindu testimony, Murray continued:
“Heathens bought the goods, heathens sent them, heathens knew the
price, heathens kept the account. Would it do honour then to the
Christian religion, to say, that you cannot swear according to our oath,
and therefore you shall not be sworn at all? What must the heathen courts
32. Ibid., 24.
33. Omichund v. Barker, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 407.
34. See Norman S. Poser, Lord Mansfield: Justice in the Age of Reason (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2013), 86, 98–99 (discussing the lucrative private practice
of Murray, including his representation of Amirchand). On Ryder’s and Murray’s official
duties, see James Oldham, “The Work of Ryder and Murray as Law Officers of the
Crown,” in Legal Record and Historical Reality, ed. Thomas G. Watkin (London: The
Hambledon Press, 1989), 157.
35. Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 30. See also Omichund v. Barker, MSS. Misc. 136,
Lincoln’s Inn Library, London, England (hereafter Omichund v. Barker, Lincoln’s Inn
Manuscript), 1135 (“[T]he Nature of Trade & Commerce require it”). This manuscript,
which is part of a five-volume set of English decisions, was written “by an unknown
hand.” John H. Baker, English Legal Manuscripts, 2 vols. (Zug, Switzerland: Inter
Documentation Co., 1975–78), 2:99. Pages 1153–68 of the manuscript contain a transcrip-
tion of Lord Chief Baron Thomas Parker’s decision, which the writer notes “was delivered
by [Parker] in Court, & which I transcribed from a Copy lent by him to Sir John Strange.”
Omichund v. Barker, Lincoln’s Inn Manuscript, 1153.
36. Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 33.
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think of our proceedings? Will it not destroy all faith and confidence
between the contracting parties?”37 Hindus believed in a god, Murray stated,
“though they may have subordinate deities, as [do] the papists who worship
saints.”38
According to custom, the judges gave oral seriatim opinions, with each
judge speaking for himself. Lord Chief Baron Thomas Parker argued that it
was necessary to admit the Hindu deponents’ statements. “Upon the
whole,” he declared, “not to admit these witnesses would be destructive
of trade, and subversive of justice, and attended with innumerable inconve-
niences.”39 Lord Chief Justice William Lee and Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke concurred. Lee, drawing on the natural-law current of
English jurisprudence, stated that “rules of evidence are to be considered
as artificial rules, framed by men for convenience in courts of justice,
and founded upon good reason: But one rule can never vary, viz. the eter-
nal rule of natural justice.”40 Hardwicke agreed that the “one general rule
of evidence” was to admit “the best [evidence] that the nature of the case
will admit.”41 Differences in religious views were no barrier. “All that is
necessary to an oath,” Hardwicke wrote, “is an appeal to the Supreme
Being, as thinking him the rewarder of truth, and avenger of falshood.”42
The opinion of Lord Chief Justice John Willes subsequently received the
most attention, primarily because later jurists disputed what Willes had
said. According to the report of defense attorney John Tracy Atkyns,
Willes stated: “I am of opinion that infidels who believe a God, and future
37. Ibid., 34. See also Omichund v. Barker, Lincoln’s Inn Manuscript, 1137 (“Christian
Courts must do Justice to the Indians if there is a Commerce between them, otherwise
there is no Faith at all & no Jurisd[ictio]n can be exercised”).
38. Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 34.
39. Ibid., 44. See also Omichund v. Barker, Lincoln’s Inn Manuscript, 1143 (“The not
admitting this Evidence would be destructive of Trade & subversive of Justice and liable
to many other Inconveniences”). The transcription of Parker’s original manuscript reads:
“The rejecting of these Witnesses would be both destructive of Trade & subversive of
Justice, & attended with infinite other Inconveniences.” Ibid., 1168.
40. Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 46. See also Omichund v. Barker, Lincoln’s Inn
Manuscript, 1147 (“The Rules of Evidence are considered as positive artificial Rules formed
by Men for their Convenience as to proceedings in Courts of Justice, but there is one Rule
which is fixed eternal & immutable, & that is the Rule of natural Justice, & all other Rules
must give way to this”).
41. Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 49. See also Omichund v. Barker, Lincoln’s Inn
Manuscript, 1150 (“[T]here is but one general Rule of Evidence, i.e. that the best
Evidence must be received, that the nature of the Case will admit”).
42. Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 48. See also Omichund v. Barker, Lincoln’s Inn
Manuscript, 1150 (“[A]ll that is necessary is, An Appeal to the Supreme Being, the
Witness of the Truth & the Avenger of Perjury”).
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rewards and punishments in the other world, may be witnesses.”43 As
interpreted in later decisions, the requirement of belief in future rewards
and punishments meant that individuals who did not believe in heaven
and hell could not swear an oath.
In 1799, however, English lawyer Charles Durnford published a length-
ier—and substantively different—version of the opinion, apparently based
on a manuscript in Willes’s papers.44 According to Durnford, Willes had
written that a witness may be admitted if he “believes a God and that he
will reward and punish him in this world, but does not believe a future
state.”45 But, Willes apparently clarified, “it must be left to the jury what
credit must be given to these infidel witnesses. For I do not think that
the same credit ought to be given either by a court or a jury to an infidel
witness as to a Christian, who is under much stronger obligations to
swear nothing but the truth.”46
Comparisons of the various Omichund reports indicates that Willes, in
his oral delivery from the bench, deviated at times from the manuscript ver-
sion published by Durnford.47 But an unpublished manuscript in the
43. Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 45 (emphasis added). Willes clarified that evidence of
religious belief could still be used to impeach a witness’s credibility. Ibid., 45–46 (“It
must be left to the jury or judge what credit they will give. . . . The same credit ought not
to be given to the evidence of an infidel, as of a Christian; because [he is] not under the
same obligations”). According to a report published in 1756, Willes stated: “I think such
Infidels, who believe in God, and that he will punish them if they swear falsly, in some
Cases, and under some Circumstances, ought to be admitted as Witnesses in this tho’ a
Christian Country, but that one who has not such Belief, cannot be admitted under any
Circumstances.” Omichund v. Barker, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 404–5.
44. Omichund v. Barker, 1 Willes 538, 125 Eng. Rep. 1310 (High Ct. Ch. 1744/5). This
report was published as Charles Durnford, Reports of Adjudged Cases in the Court of
Common Pleas During the Time Lord Chief Justice Willes Presided in That Court
(London: A. Strahan, 1799). The report was later published in Philadelphia and was widely
cited in the United States. For a study of the use of manuscript case notes in eighteenth-cen-
tury England, see James Oldham, “The Indispensability of Manuscript Case Notes to
Eighteenth-Century Barristers and Judges,” in Making Legal History: Approaches and
Methodologies, ed. Anthony Musson and Chantal Stebbings (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 30–52. For an introduction to eighteenth-century reporting prac-
tices, see, for example, James Oldham, “Underreported and Underrated: The Court of
Common Pleas in the Eighteenth Century,” in Law as Culture and Culture as Law:
Essays in Honor of John Phillip Reid, ed. Hendrik Hartog and William E. Nelson
(Madison, WI: Madison House Publishers, Inc., 2000), 119–46.
45. Omichund v. Barker, 1 Willes 550. See also ibid., 549.
46. Ibid., 550.
47. Some comments, for example, appear in other reports but not in the Durnford report.
Compare 1 Atk. 44 (“Lord Coke is a very great lawyer, but our Saviour and St. Peter are in
this respect much better authorities”), and 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 403 (“Coke was certainly a very
great Lawyer, but I think our Saviour and St. Peter in these Matters much better
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Lincoln’s Inn Library seems to confirm the Durnford report’s position: that
Willes declared all theists as capable of swearing an oath, even if judges
sometimes barred their testimony because it was not the “best evidence”
available.48 Perhaps he was worried that Jewish witnesses might be cate-
gorically excluded if the law required belief in rewards and punishments
after death.49 More importantly, however, the decisions of Willes and his
colleagues reflect a transformation of English evidence law from rules
Authorities”), and Lincoln’s Inn Manuscript, 1144 (“Now my Lord Coke is a great
Authority, but it must be allowed, that Our Saviour & St. Peter are greater”), with 1
Willes 542 (“It is a little mean narrow notion . . .”). Moreover, the 1756 report, the 1765
Atkyns report, and the unpublished manuscript seem to have been independently recorded
when the decisions were read, given that some material appears in the Durnford report
and only one of the two earlier reports. Compare 1 Willes 541 (“Serjt. Hawkins (though
a very learned pains-taking man) is plainly mistaken in his History of the Pleas of the
Crown . . . where he understands Lord Coke as not excluding the Jews from being witnesses,
but only Heathens. . . . I shall therefore take it for granted. . . . [A]lmost ever since the Jews
have returned into England, they have been admitted to be sworn as witnesses”), with 1 Atk.
44 (“Serjeant Hawkins in his Pleas of the Crown, though a very learned and pains taking
man, is mistaken in his notion of lord Coke’s opinion; long before his time, and ever
since the Jews returned to England, they have been constantly admitted as witnesses”),
and 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 402 (“Hawkins, tho’ a very Pains-taking Man, is, I think, plainly mis-
taken in his [Pleas of the Crown] where he understands him otherwise. I shall therefore take
this for granted”), and Lincoln’s Inn Manuscript, 1144 (“Serj[ean]t Hawkins in his [Pleas of
the Crown] is mistaken in his Opinion of my Lord Co[ke]. I take it for granted my Lord Coke
meant Infidels generally, & that lessens the Authority of what he says, for Jews were admit-
ted before his time & since”).
48. See Lincoln’s Inn Manuscript, 1146 (“The best Evidence, that the Party can procure
must be rece[ive]d; But if better Evidence is produced on the other Side, the first is to be
rejected; As if a Copy of a Deed be offered in Evidence & on the other Side the original
is produced & differs from the copy. So if an Infidel who believes only a Reward &
Punishment in this world be contradicted by a Christian”). For more on the approach to evi-
dence law that led to this view, see notes 60 and 62 and accompanying text.
49. Christians generally interpreted the Old Testament, shared by the Jewish faith, as sup-
porting the existence of a future state; see, for example, The Religious Magazine or Spirit of
the Foreign Theological Journals and Reviews 2 (1828): 17; and Richard Graves, “A Future
State Known to the Jews,” in The Whole Works of Richard Graves, 4 vols., ed. Richard
Hastings Graves (Dublin: William Curry Jr. & Co., 1840), 2:288, but concerns about
Jewish beliefs occasionally cropped up. See, for example, Edward Livingston to M[ordecai]
M[anuel] Noah, [1825], Edward Livingston Papers, Princeton University (“Does the
[Jewish] sect which denied the existence of a future state still subsist? Is it numerous?
Are there any congregations of them in the U.S.[?]”); see also Jacob Rush, “The Nature
of an Oath Stated and Explained,” in Charges and Extracts of Charges, on Moral and
Religious Subjects; Delivered at Sundry Times, by the Honorable Jacob Rush
(Philadelphia: D. Hogan, 1803), 29 (“the sanction of rewards and punishments is more
fully revealed by the Christian religion, and consequently the degree of guilt in transgressing
the rules of moral duty, must be greater”). For a discussion of the treatment of Jewish wit-
nesses in English courts after Omichund, see Karen A. Macfarlane, “‘Does He Know the
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based on a person’s status to ones based on the perceived evidentiary value
of the person’s testimony.50
B. American Reception of the Common Law
Oath requirements in the United States initially followed the rule espoused
in Atkyns’ report, thus confining testimony to those who believed in
heaven and hell.51 In perhaps the most influential American opinion, the
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors declared in its 1809 decision in
Curtiss v. Strong:52 “Every person who does not believe in the obligation
of an oath, and a future state of rewards and punishments, or any account-
ability after death for his conduct, is by law excluded from being a witness;
for to such a person the law presumes no credit is to be given.”53 At least as
a statement of the “law on the books,” this view became axiomatic. Over
and over again, Americans observed that oath takers must believe in
heaven and hell.54
Danger of an Oath’? Oaths, Religion, Ethnicity and the Advent of the Adversarial Criminal
Trial in the Eighteenth Century,” Immigrants & Minorities 31 (2013): 334–36.
50. Many scholars have noted this shift in the epistemological underpinnings of English
evidence rules. See, for example, Brewer, By Birth or Consent, 162–74. The erosion of
status-based rules was part of a broader evolution in English law. See, for example,
Duncan Kennedy, “The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries,” Buffalo Law Review 28
(1979): 299.
51. See Zephaniah Swift, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, in Civil and Criminal Cases
(Hartford: Oliver D. Cooke, 1810), 47–48; and Note, “An Originalist Analysis of the No
Religious Test Clause,” Harvard Law Review 120 (2007): 1655–56 (quoting several fram-
ers’ views of oaths). But see James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, October 28, 1787, in
The Papers of James Madison, 17 vols., ed. William T. Hutchinson and William M.
E. Rachal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962–91), 10:233 (“If the person swearing
believes in the supreme being who is invoked, and in the penal consequences of offending
him, either in this or a future world or both, he will be under the same restraint from perjury
as if he had previously subscribed a test requiring this belief” [emphasis added]).
52. Curtiss v. Strong, 4 Day 51 (Conn. 1809). This volume of Thomas Day’s reports was
published in 1813. The case, which involved a disputed will, turned on the admissibility of a
witness who apparently “did not . . . believe in the obligation of an oath, and in a future state
of rewards and punishments, or any accountability for his conduct after death.” Ibid., 52.
53. Ibid., 55.
54. Daniel L. Dreisbach, “The Constitution’s Forgotten Religion Clause: Reflections on
the Article VI Religious Test Ban,” Journal of Church and State 38 (1996): 293; Tara
E. Strauch, “Taking Oaths and Giving Thanks; Ritual and Religion in Revolutionary
America” (PhD diss., University of South Carolina, 2013), 126. See, for example, Rush,
“The Nature of an Oath Stated and Explained,” 34; State v. Cooper, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.)
96, 97 (1807) (report of the opinion of Campbell, J.); James Madison to Edmund
Pendleton, October 28, 1787, in The Papers of James Madison 10:223 (noting that oaths
were “a religious test” of sorts).
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Through a cynical lens, the American reception of the common-law rule
might appear as a continuation of the status-based religious discrimination of
an earlier time, when Jews and Catholics were barred from testifying
because of religious intolerance.55 English and American commentators in
the early nineteenth century, however, took a far more ecumenical approach.
In his 1804 evidence treatise, for example, Thomas Peake explained that the
only permissible religious inquiry was whether a witness “believed the sanc-
tion of an oath,” meaning “the being of a Deity, and a future state of rewards
and punishments.”56 Broader religious exclusions, Peake wrote, arose
“when a gloomy superstition had obscured all liberal sentiment.”57
Connecticut jurist Zephaniah Swift agreed. The solemnity of an oath, he
noted, “aris[es] from a belief in the existence of a God, and a future state
of rewards and punishments.”58 But Swift denounced broader religion-based
exclusions as founded on “illiberal sentiments” that were “entertained at an
early period, when there was more superstition than true religion.”59
Rather than relying on sectarian hostility, Americans in the early nine-
teenth century justified the common-law rule as being essential to discov-
ering truth, which had become the overwhelming focus of eighteenth-
century evidence commentaries.60 “You can impose no obligation to tell
the truth, on the man who fears not a God, as an avenger of perjury,”
one writer remarked. “The tardy and evasive vengeance attached by
human laws to perjury, is all that he cares to avoid,” the author continued,
“and his asseverations . . . will be as easily swayed by any gust of passion
or preponderance of interest, as is the weathercock by the passing
breeze.”61 Early on, Americans seem to have broadly accepted the neces-
sity of religion-based oaths, particularly given the difficulty of proving
55. See note 22.
56. Thomas Peake, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence, 2nd ed. (London: Brooke &
Clarke, 1804), 141–42.
57. Ibid., 139.
58. Swift, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, 47–48.
59. Ibid., 48.
60. See, for example, Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Evidence (London: Henry Lintot,
1756). See also Barbara J. Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause:
Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1991), 26–27 (noting the epistemological concerns of eighteenth-century
evidence treatise writers, including Gilbert). Notably, the influential epistemological ideas
of John Locke included the view that “the social fabric depends on commitments under-
pinned by the fear of God.” Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality: Christian
Foundations in Locke’s Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002), 223.
61. “Review on the Exclusion of Infidels from Judicial Oaths,” Christian Spectator,
September 1829, 444.
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perjury under an evidence regime that strenuously sought to avoid eviden-
tiary conflicts.62 As Sally Gordon explains, “Failure to protect the religious
power of oaths would undermine the rule of law altogether, [George]
Washington, [James] Kent and others predicted, plunging the nation into
self-destructive chaos.”63
But how did courts know which witnesses had the requisite religious
beliefs? “It would seem to be incongruous to admit a man to his oath,”
the Curtiss court observed, “for the purpose of learning from him whether
he had the necessary qualifications to be sworn.”64 Consequently,
American courts limited their review to hearsay evidence; that is, accounts
of what prospective witnesses had said to others about their religious
views.65 Another pressing concern was religious liberty. “A man’s opin-
ions are matters between himself and his God, so long as he does not
62. See Swift, System of the Laws, 2:249 (“the law will presume that every body swears
the truth, and that no man will be guilty of perjury”). Perjury rules required two witnesses to
prove that someone was lying under oath. Ibid., 400; and William Hawkins, A Treatise of the
Pleas of the Crown, 6th ed. (London: Thomas Leach, 1777), 719. This rule reflected a
numerological approach to evidence law. See Fisher, “The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector,”
653 (“Almost every major treatise suggested that whenever jurors faced the task of choosing
between conflicting oaths, they should tend to give more credit to the side that produced the
greatest number of witnesses”). For the epistemological foundations of this approach, see
Witt, “Making the Fifth,” 850 n. 89. Useful surveys of contemporary treatises can be
found in William Twining, Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 45–55, and in Brewer, By Birth or
Consent, 369–75.
63. Sarah Barringer Gordon, “Blasphemy and the Law of Religious Liberty in
Nineteenth-Century America,” American Quarterly 52 (2000): 686. See also James
Hutson, Forgotten Features of the Founding: The Recovery of Religious Themes in the
Early American Republic (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003), 1–36; Philip
Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2002), 70; Michael W. McConnell, “The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion,” Harvard Law Review 103 (1990): 1467; and note 85. For more on
English perjury law, see James Oldham, English Common Law in the Age of Mansfield
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 268–75.
64. Curtiss v. Strong, 4 Day 56. Several years before the Curtiss decision, Tapping Reeve
had endorsed the same procedure: “An atheist is not a good witness, because an oath is not
binding. The way to discover their belief is not by appealing to them in Court; but by their
avowed declarations out of Court. This is a Com. Law Principle.” Lonson Nash, Lectures on
Various Legal Subjects Delivered in the Litchfield Law School, 1803, 2:736, MS 4004,
Harvard Law School Library. See also Bow v. Parsons, 1 Conn. (1 Root) 480, 481
(1792) (“The court admitted parol testimony of particular conversations and declarations
to evince his infidelity”).
65. See Wesley J. Campbell, “A New Approach to Nineteenth-Century Religious
Exemption Cases,” Stanford Law Review 63 (2011): 983 n.50–52 (collecting cases).
Occasionally, however, courts did permit direct questioning of witnesses. See, for example,
“Want of Religious Belief,” Niles’ Weekly Register (Baltimore), October 2, 1830, 103
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disclose them,” Zephaniah Swift explained, “and it is wholly inconsistent
with the rights of conscience, to compel him to do it.”66
To modern sensibilities, discriminating against prospective witnesses
based on their religious views would seem to pose at least as great a threat
to religious liberty as asking witnesses about those beliefs, but this was not
so in the early nineteenth century. Although attentive to the relationship
between evidence rules and religious liberty, Swift apparently did not per-
ceive any objection to the exclusion of witnesses based on their beliefs.
Similarly, none of the appellate counsel in Curtiss—all well-known law-
yers and former members of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors—
suggested that the restrictive common-law rule might violate a witness’s
civil rights. Understanding why requires a closer look at contemporary
understandings of religious freedom.
C. Equality and Religious Freedom
Religious liberty at the founding was not a one-dimensional concept.
Rather, religious freedom encompassed a collection of discrete—albeit
conceptually related—rights, privileges, and immunities. To use an anal-
ogy familiar to students of property law, the eighteenth-century concept
of religious liberty was like a “bundle of sticks”: rules that were logically
separable, allowing constitutional protection for religious freedom to vary
in significant ways from state to state.
Across the board, the heart of every state’s protection for religious lib-
erty was a guarantee of the natural and inalienable freedom of conscience
and worship. Delaware’s 1776 declaration of rights was typical, announc-
ing that “all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their consciences and understandings.”67
This natural-rights formulation is revealing. Upon entering society, the
inalienable right to exercise religion remained in force, subject to a bar
(reporting “the late trial of J. F. Knapp, at Salem,” in which a lawyer questioned a witness
about his beliefs).
66. Swift, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, 49. Although courts usually framed this rule
in terms of religious liberty, it also had roots in the general evidentiary rule against asking
questions “the direct object and immediate tendency of which are to degrade, disgrace, and
disparage the witness, and shew his moral turpitude and infamy.” Ibid., 79–80.
67. Delaware Declaration of Rights of 1776, § 2, in Neil H. Cogan, ed., The Complete Bill
of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, and Origins (New York: Oxford University Press,
1997), 15. See also Wesley J. Campbell, “Religious Neutrality in the Early Republic,”
Regent Law Review 24 (2012): 319 (collecting provisions from other states).
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against unjustly harming others.68 All individuals thus had an equal and
conditional “right” to believe and practice their faith without interference.69
Unlike our widely accepted understanding today, however, free-exercise
rights in the Early Republic generally prohibited only direct interference
with private liberty, not indirect burdens created by the withdrawal of
civil privileges. This explains why, for example, states could guarantee
freedom of conscience while simultaneously imposing religious tests for
officeholders.70 A religious test, Justice Samuel Wilde of Massachusetts
explained in 1821, “does not interfere with the rights of conscience.—
No person has any conscience about becoming a Legislator. He is not
obliged to accept of office, and he has no right to claim it.”71 According
to this view, religious discrimination was permitted as long as individuals
68. See, for example, Philip A. Hamburger, “Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American
Constitutions,” Yale Law Journal 102 (1993): 922–30.
69. Americans in the Founding Era and Early Republic often spoke of “rights,” but this
language did not necessarily contemplate judicial definition and enforcement. See Jack
Rakove, Original Meanings (New York: Knopf, 1996), 288–338; and Jud Campbell,
“Judicial Review and the Enumeration of Rights,” Georgetown Journal of Law and
Public Policy 15 (2017): 569–92. See generally Larry D. Kramer, The People
Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004).
70. See Campbell, “Religious Neutrality,” 336; Saul Cornell, “Moving Beyond the Canon
of Traditional Constitutional History: Anti-Federalists, the Bill of Rights, and the Promise of
Post-Modern Historiography,” Law and History Review 12 (1994): 27; and Dreisbach, “The
Constitution’s Forgotten Religion Clause,” 286–88. See generally Hamburger, “Natural
Rights.” This point is often lost among even the most sophisticated modern observers.
See, for example, Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to
the Passage of the First Amendment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 196
(describing as “contradictory sentiments” an eighteenth-century endorsement of freedom
of conscience alongside support for test oaths).
71. Journal of Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of Delegates, Chosen to
Revise the Constitution of Massachusetts (Boston: Daily Advertiser, 1821), 90. Along
similar lines, Zephaniah Swift defended the consistency of free-exercise rights and state-
imposed religious assessments, arguing that “[a] Jew, a Mehometan, or a Bramin, may prac-
tice all the rites and ceremonies of their religion, without interruption, or danger of incurring
any punishment,” and that “[e]very Christian may believe, worship, and support in such
manner as he thinks right, and if he does not feel disposed to join public worship, he
may stay at home and believe as he pleases.” Swift, System of the Laws, 1:146. See also
David Daggett, Count the Cost (Hartford: Hundson and Goodwin, 1804), 5–6 (“Our laws
permit every man to worship God when, where, and in the manner most agreeable to his
principles or to his inclination; and not the least restraint is imposed; all ideas of dictating
to the conscience are discarded”); and Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia
(London: John Stockdale, 1787), 265 (“[I]t does me no injury for my neighbor to say
there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg. If it be
said, his testimony in a court of justice cannot be relied on, reject it then, and be the stigma
on him”).
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were free to practice their religion without being compelled to violate their
conscience.72
Beyond the core protection for free exercise, the bundle of rights, priv-
ileges, and immunities often known collectively as “religious liberty” var-
ied considerably among states. Some constitutions authorized qualified
religious establishments,73 whereas others banned them.74 In states that
levied assessments used for building churches or supporting ministers,
state constitutions often exempted religious dissenters.75 And, most rele-
vant here, many states guaranteed some form of civil equality among
sects, beyond the equality of their inalienable free-exercise rights.
Equality provisions varied among states. New Jersey’s 1776
Constitution, for example, guaranteed that “no Protestant Inhabitant of
this Colony shall be denied the Enjoyment of any civil Right merely on
Account of his religious principles.”76 Delaware extended this protection
to “all persons professing the Christian religion,”77 whereas Virginia mag-
nanimously declared in its 1786 bill for religious freedom that the religious
views of individuals “shall in nowise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil
capacities.”78 But many states did not prohibit discrimination in civil rights
and privileges on account of religious belief. Massachusetts and New
Hampshire provided only that Christians would be “equally under the pro-
tection of the law,”79 a phrasing that, as Philip Hamburger has explained,
“permitted inequalities in rights not existing in the state of nature.”80
72. In combination with subpoena requirements, traditional oaths required Quakers and
some other Christian sects to violate their religious duties. See notes 87–91 and accompany-
ing text.
73. See, for example, Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Part I, art. III, in Cogan,
Complete Bill of Rights, 21. Five of fourteen states “made provision for tax support of min-
isters, and those five plus seven others continued religious tests for public office.” Mark
A. Noll, The Old Religion in a New World: The History of North American Christianity
(Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002), 72.
74. See, for example, New Jersey Constitution of 1776, § XIX, in Cogan, Complete Bill of
Rights, 25; North Carolina Constitution of 1776, § XXXIV, in ibid., 30; Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1790, § III, in ibid., 33.
75. See, for example, New Jersey Constitution of 1776, § XIX, in ibid., 25; North
Carolina Constitution of 1776, § XXXIV, in ibid., 31.
76. New Jersey Constitution of 1776, § XIX, in ibid., 25. See also Vermont Constitution
of 1777, § 3, in ibid., 41.
77. Delaware Declaration of Rights of 1776, § 2, in ibid., 15.
78. Bill for Religious Freedom, in ibid., 52.
79. See Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Part I, art. III, in ibid., 21; New Hampshire
Constitution of 1783, Part I, art. V, in ibid., 23.
80. Philip A. Hamburger, “Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate About
Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights,” Supreme Court Review 8 (1992): 299. For a more
complete explanation, see ibid., 317–36; and Bernadette Meyler, “The Equal Protection of
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Because the imagined “state of nature” lacked courts, testifying was a
“civil” rather than “natural” right.
The Founding Era distinction between natural free-exercise rights and
positive-law guarantees of civil nondiscrimination came to the fore in 1820,
when New York’s highest court confronted a novel challenge to religion-
based competency rules. In Jackson v. Gridley,81 the defendant claimed
that excluding a witness because of his faith offended the state constitution’s
free-exercise clause. The witness reportedly had denied any belief in God and
punishment after death, although he later claimed that “he had formerly
embraced the principles of Universalists, and rather believed it was right.”82
While acknowledging that witnesses who did not believe in hell were incom-
petent at common law, the defense lawyer wanted to introduce the witness’s
own testimony regarding his recently converted beliefs. Opposing counsel
objected, arguing that “the Court should require the strongest and best
evidence of the witness’s sincere recantation of his abominable creed.”83
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Ambrose Spencer ruled that the con-
tested witness should not have been admitted to testify. He cited Chief
Justice Willes’s decision in Omichund without mentioning ambiguities in
the various English reports.84 Spencer’s opinion, however, includes a
revealing passage about religious freedom:
Religion is a subject on which every man has a right to think according to the
dictates of his understanding. It is a solemn concern between his conscience
and his God, with which no human tribunal has a right to meddle. But in the
development of facts, and the ascertainment of truth, human tribunals have a
right to interfere. They are bound to see that no man’s rights are impaired or
taken away, but through the medium of testimony entitled to belief; and no
testimony is entitled to credit, unless delivered under the solemnity of an
oath, which comes home to the conscience of the witness, and will create
a tie arising from his belief that false swearing would expose him to
Free Exercise: Two Approaches and their History,” Boston College Law Review 47 (2006):
293–311. Meyler briefly discusses religion-based competency cases. Ibid., 295–96.
Interestingly, Connecticut’s laws barring Christians from openly avowing atheism, polytheism,
Unitarianism, and apostasy were enforced through a denial of civil privileges on the first offense
and denial of protection of law on the second offense. See Swift, System of the Laws, 2:321.
81. Jackson ex dem. Tuttle v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98 (N.Y. 1820). In 1820, the Supreme
Court was New York’s highest court of law, with appeals running only to the quasi-
legislative Court for the Trial of Impeachment and Correction of Errors. See Albert
M. Rosenblatt, “The New York Court of Appeals,” Green Bag 2d 11 (2008): 469.
82. Jackson v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 99.
83. Ibid., 102.
84. Ibid., 103. Spencer’s citation to Omichund may have been based on his reading of
Curtiss v. Strong or Swift’s Law of Evidence rather than on his own reading of the Willes
or Atkyns reports. Ibid., 103–4.
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punishment in the life to come. On this great principle rest all our institutions,
and especially the distribution of justice between man and man.85
The constitutional concern for Spencer, it bears emphasis, was the inquiry
into a person’s religious beliefs, not governmental discrimination based on
those views. A witness’s religious faith was “a solemn concern between his
conscience and his God,” shielding him against direct questioning.86 But
once those religious views were known, religion-based exclusions did
not infringe on New York’s constitutional guarantee of free exercise.
Simply put, prospective witnesses were free to practice their religion
regardless of their competency to testify.
By contrast, conventional oath requirements did conflict with free-
exercise principles in a way that was unrelated to disbelief in God or
hell. Witnesses, jurors, and public officials were ordinarily required to
swear oaths, but Quakers, along with a few other Protestant sects, refused
to take public oaths based on a literal interpretation of Christ’s injunction,
“Swear not at all.”87 By the end of the eighteenth century, nearly every
American state had passed statutes or constitutional provisions allowing
Quakers, and sometimes other religious objectors, to affirm in at least
some cases.88 But affirmations were not a generally available alternative
to oath taking. Rather, affirmations were available only to members of
denominations whose religious tenets prohibited swearing.89 Prospective
85. Ibid., 106. Defenses of oaths often appeared in other contemporary religious liberty
cases. See, for example, Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle 48, 51 (Pa. 1817)
(“Laws cannot be administered in any civilized government unless the people are taught
to revere the sanctity of an oath, and look to a future state of rewards and punishments
for the deeds of this life”); Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 407
(Pa. 1824) (impugning Christianity would “weaken the confidence in human veracity, so
essential to the purposes of society, and without which no question of property could be
decided, and no criminal brought to justice; an oath in the common form, on a discredited
book, would be a most idle ceremony”).
86. Jackson v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 106.
87. Matthew 5:34 (King James).
88. McConnell, “The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise,” 1467–68.
89. See, for example, Swift, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, 51; Q.E.D., “Messrs.
Editors,” Albany Argus, December 25, 1821; “Report Relating to Incompetency of
Witnesses on Account of Religious Belief,” Massachusetts Senate Report Number 22
(Boston: Charles Hudson, 1838), 8; and Campbell, “A New Approach,” 978–80, 984–86.
For the rule that the availability of affirmations required religious scruples, see, for example,
Lewis v. Maris, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 278, 285 (Pa. 1788); and State v. Putnam, 1 N.J. L. 260
(1794). Some states codified this rule. See, for example, “An Act Concerning Oaths,” §
16 (April 2, 1801), in Laws of the State of New York, 2 vols. (Albany, NY: Charles
R. Webster and George Webster, 1802), 405 (“[E]very person believing in the existence
of a Supreme Being, and a future state of rewards and punishments, who shall have consci-
entious scruples against taking an oath, shall [affirm in lieu of swearing]”); and “An Act for
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witnesses who did not believe in God or hell were not allowed to affirm in
place of swearing.90 In short, nonbelievers in God or hell were unaccom-
modated in all types of public oath taking.91
II. Universalism
Among Christians, belief in future rewards and punishments was wide-
spread and uncontroversial throughout most of the eighteenth century.
reducing into one, the several Acts prescribing the Oath of Fidelity and Oaths of Public
Officers,” § 8 (December 22, 1792), in A Collection of All Such Acts of the General
Assembly of Virginia . . . (Richmond: Samuel Pleasants, Jr. and Henry Pace, 1803), 55 (affir-
mations available to “[a]ny person refusing to take an oath, and declaring religious scruples
to be the true and only reason of such refusal”). For the rule that religious scruples had to be
shown by evidence of denominational membership, see, for example, Bryan’s Case, 1 D.C.
(1 Cranch C.C.) 151 (C.C.D.C. 1804).
90. Later on, however, reformers occasionally argued that affirmations demonstrated that
oaths were unnecessary. See note 225.
91. As it turned out, nearly all nineteenth-century controversies about oath taking
involved putative witnesses—not jurors or public officials—in part because direct question-
ing of oath takers was usually prohibited, see note 65, and in part because nobody outside of
the courtroom could object, see Stewart Rapalje, A Treatise on the Law of Witnesses
(Albany, NY: Banks & Brothers, 1887), 14–15 n.2. Still, some people may have felt unable
to take public oaths because of their beliefs. See Bernard Whitman, “Letter II [November
1830],” in Two Letters to the Reverend Moses Stuart: On the Subject of Religious
Liberty, 2nd ed. (Boston: Gray & Bowen, 1831), 148 (observing that religious barriers to
oath taking meant that “universalists . . . must be excluded from every office of honor,
trust, or emolument . . . where an oath of fidelity or allegiance is required” because they
“will not act the part of hypocrites”); “Religious Test Applied to Witnesses,”
Rhode-Island American [Providence], November 20, 1827 (religious premise of oath taking
“takes from him one of his dearest privileges, the right of holding any office, or exercising
any right to which is attached the sanction of an oath”). Some writers, however, thought that
competency rules did not apply to other types of oaths. In 1839, for example, a Boston trial
court—recognizing as “very doubtful” that jurors and public officials could be prevented
from swearing on account of their religious beliefs—explained that, in contrast to oaths
taken by witnesses, the oaths of jurors and public officials were “promissory” and not subject
to perjury penalties. Commonwealth v. Gates (Boston Police Ct. 1839) (Rogers, J.), reported
in “Religious Belief of Witnesses,” Washington National Intelligencer, July 2, 1839. See
also Caleb Cushing, The Right of Universalists to Testify in a Court of Justice Vindicated
(Boston: Bowles and Dearborn, 1828), 20. “[I]t is well settled that the principles of law
respecting the oath of a witness in a court of justice, are wholly inapplicable to an oath of
office” (citing Omichund v. Barker, 1 Willes 538, 548 [High Ct. Ch. 1744/5]). Cushing’s
authorship is confirmed in Claude M. Fuess, The Life of Caleb Cushing, 2 vols.
(New York: Harcourt, Bruce & Co., 1923), 1:81. Cushing was stretching Willes’s point,
which was simply that the rule “that an oath cannot be altered, nor a new one imposed,
but by authority of parliament relates only to promisory oath or oaths of office.”
Omichund, 1 Willes 548.
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Not surprisingly, therefore, very few reported cases in the years immedi-
ately following Curtiss v. Strong involved challenges to the restrictive
common-law rule.92 But theological developments soon undermined this
stability.
Around the time of the American Revolution, a group of liberal theolo-
gians centered in New England began rethinking Christ’s redemption of
human sin. Building on Calvinism, which one scholar has noted “still
dominated American theology in the eighteenth century,”93 several
Massachusetts ministers began teaching that Christ’s death had ensured
salvation to all humanity.94 Based on their belief in universal salvation,
these religious reformers called themselves Universalists.
Initially, Universalists retained belief that God would punish sin after
death, although only temporarily.95 But church doctrine continued to evolve
in ways that created an escalating conflict with common-law competency
rules. In the first edition of his Treatise of Atonement (1805), Universalist
minister Hosea Ballou argued that God’s love was unchanging, and that,
therefore, atonement was designed for the benefit of the individual, without
being required for divine salvation.96 By the third edition of his Treatise in
1812, Ballou expressed doubt in the existence of any future punishment,
and shortly thereafter he openly denied punishment after death.97
Ballou’s teachings were controversial, even among fellow
Universalists.98 Denying all forms of punishment after death, many
92. In 1817, newspapers across the nation reported that North Carolina Chief Justice John
Louis Taylor had refused to admit a witness on account of his supposed belief that there was
not “either a heaven or a hell! Nor any future rewards or punishment!” See, for example,
“Important Judicial Decision,” Connecticut Journal, April 22, 1817; and “Important
Judicial Decision,” Vermont Intelligencer, May 5, 1817. Although little can be gleaned
from the short newspaper reports, the disputed legal issue seems to have been whether
the witness could testify as to his own religious beliefs, not whether such a witness
would be competent if he disbelieved in future punishment.
93. E. Brooks Holifield, Theology in America: Christian Thought from the Age of the
Puritans to the Civil War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 221.
94. Ibid., 221–26.
95. Ibid., 226–27. Even this position sometimes led to accusations that Universalist belief
“destroys both the solemnity and validity of an oath, which are predicated upon the certain
future punishment of perjury.” Richard Eddy, Universalism in Gloucester, Mass.
(Gloucester, MA: Procter Brothers, 1892), 175–76 (reprinting a public letter by residents of
Gloucester dated October 1785); see Kathryn Gin Lum, Damned Nation: Hell in America
from the Revolution to Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 31–32.
96. Holifield, Theology in America, 228–29.
97. Ibid., 230. See also Curtiss v. Strong, 4 Day 54 (referring to “Universalists, who
believe there is no punishment after death”).
98. Ann Lee Bressler, The Universalist Movement in America, 1770–1880 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 16.
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believed, would lead to the proliferation of sin. As Seth Cowell wrote in
1821: “If wicked men are made to believe . . . that salvation is infallibly
certain, they will have no motive sufficiently powerful to induce them to
oppose the corrupt propensities of their nature.”99 Some Universalists
shared similar concerns about discouraging good behavior, and many mod-
erated their views, although remaining committed to the idea of universal
salvation. By the 1850s, Ann Bressler writes, “most Universalists were
rejecting an ultra-Universalist position in favor of a belief in some form
of limited future punishment.”100 Ballou’s teachings, however, drew thou-
sands of followers. And although Universalism represented the theological
extreme, other Christian sects also rejected or de-emphasized the impor-
tance of eternal damnation.101
These changes had a transformative effect on oath taking. In the late
eighteenth century, oaths were understood as implicit acknowledgments
that forsaken sinners went to hell, creating a strong presumption in favor
of trusting sworn testimony. Theological shifts, however, weakened the
religious underpinnings of oaths in two ways. First, the declining impor-
tance of hell in American religion lessened the perceived effectiveness of
oaths as a deterrent against lying.102 Second, the advent of Universalism
created a significant conflict between mainstream religious views and exist-
ing competency rules. The common-law rule had not changed, but neither
had it previously excluded an entire sect of faithful Christians.103
99. Ibid., 166 n. 45 (quoting Seth Crowell, Strictures on the Doctrine of Universal
Salvation: Wherein the Doctrine Is Disproved on the Principle of the Moral Government
of God [New York: Holt & Bolmore, 1821], 114).
100. Ibid., 46.
101. Ibid., 126–27. See, for example, William Rounseville Alger, A Critical History of the
Doctrine of a Future Life with a Complete Bibliography of the Subject (Philadelphia: G.W.
Childs 1864), 537; Thomas L. Nichols, Religions of the World: An Impartial History of
Religious Creeds, Forms of Worship, Sects, Controversies, and Manifestations, from the
Earliest Period to the Present Time (Cincinnati: Valentine Nicholson & Co., 1855), 67; see
also Lum, Damned Nation, 125 (noting “a wider backlash against the idea of damnation”);
Nathan O. Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1989), 170–74 (noting that many sects rejected Calvanist emphasis on for-
mal doctrine); James D. Bratt, “The Reorientation of American Protestantism, 1835–1845,”
Church History 67 (1998): 69 (stating that many sects focused on personal relationships
with God rather than “seeking, finding, and losing salvation”); and David Hempton,
Methodism: Empire of the Spirit (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 25, 75 (argu-
ing that Methodist teachings focused on God’s love rather than the prospect of damnation).
102. Many Americans began to doubt the duration of punishment after death (see note 95)
and even among believers in eternal punishment, damnation was less central in their reli-
gious thinking (see note 101).
103. Quakers were only excluded because of their own refusal to swear (see notes 87–91)
not because the law barred them from swearing. Christopher Grasso has discovered one
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A. Ignoring the Common Law
Confronted with the collision between Universalist faith and competency
rules, nineteenth-century judges occasionally ignored or overlooked the
common law. In the Massachusetts case of Hunscom v. Hunscom
(1818),104 for example, the short report of the decision states, in full:
This was a libel for divorce a vinculo. On the trial a witness being offered to
prove the adultery, Wilson, for the respondent, objected to his being sworn;
and founded his objection to the competency of the witness, upon his pro-
fessed disbelief of a future state of existence, and offered to prove his
repeated declarations of such disbelief. But the Court admitted him to be
sworn, and said the objection went only to his credibility.105
This brief, and frequently misunderstood, report seems to be the earliest
published account of someone who lacked a belief in future punishment
being held admissible as a witness.106
instance in which the testimony of an outspoken deist was rejected on account of his reli-
gious views. See Grasso, “The Boundaries of Toleration and Tolerance,” 292–93; see also
Henry Pattillo, “An Address to the Deists,” in Sermons, &c (Wilmington, DE: James
Adams, 1788), 273 (“[A]n oath is an act of worship . . . . The absurdity, the impiety of
this act of religious worship, in the mouth of a Deist, must strike every person present
with a degree of horror”).
104. Hunscom v. Hunscom, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng.) 184 (1818). For this session, Tyng’s
reports note: “The reporter was not present at this term, and is indebted to the minutes of
a highly respected friend at the bar, for the arguments of the counsel, and in some instance
for the decision of the court, in the cases here reported.” Dudley Atkins Tyng, Reports of
Cases, Argued and Determined in the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts (Boston: Cummings and Hilliard, 1819), 15:178. The original case records
and case file do not provide any insights regarding the excluded witness. See Hancock
County, Maine, Supreme Judicial Court Records, 4:203, Maine State Archives; and
Hancock County, Maine, Supreme Judicial Court Case Files, Castine sitting, June 1818,
Hanscom v. Hanscom, case no. 13, Maine State Archives.
105. Hunscom, 15 Mass. 184 (italics in the original). The punctuation tracks the published
1819 report. In an 1851 edition, lawyer Benjamin Rand added a footnote citing subsequent
cases. See Dudley Atkins Tyng, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme
Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, ed. Benjamin Rand (Boston: Charles
C. Little and James Brown, 1851), 15:172.
106. In Rutherford v. Moore, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch C.C.) 404 (C.C.D.C. 1807), lawyer
Francis Scott Key (soon to be famous for other reasons) objected to a witness who had pur-
portedly “declared his disbelief in a future state of rewards and punishments.” Key cited
English authorities, including the Omichund decision, in favor of his objection. Chief
Judge William Cranch stated that he was “inclined to think” that the objection “ought to
go rather to the credit” of the witness instead of his competency, “[b]ut Mr. Key waived
the question as to the competency, and examined his witnesses as to the credibility.” Ibid.
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Scholars often misinterpret Hunscom as a precedential decision that
atheists could testify.107 The decision, however, had nothing to do with
atheists, as contemporaries widely recognized.108 Hunscom’s supposed
precedential status is also questionable. The evidentiary decision was a
trial-level ruling, issued when a panel of the Supreme Judicial Court was
riding circuit in the district of Maine, and the judges did not control
which decisions were reported. Indeed, observers sometimes viewed the
Hunscom report with a skeptical eye.109 Nonetheless, its publication
seems to have influenced Massachusetts law.110
Universalist competency to testify soon followed in other states. The
Illinois Supreme Court permitted the introduction of a Universalist’s
107. For example, John Witt remarks that “the Supreme Judicial Court abolished the dis-
qualification of atheists in 1818.” John Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled
Workingmen, Destitute Widows, and the Remaking of American Law (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2004), 57. See also Michael S. Ariens and Robert A. Destro,
Religious Liberty in a Pluralistic Society (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002),
105 (“In Massachusetts . . . a witness’s lack of religious belief initially went only to credibil-
ity, not competence”). Compare with Fisher, “The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector,” 678 n.481
(describing Hunscom, without suggesting any precedential status, as “holding that a wit-
ness’s atheism went only to credibility, not to competency”).
108. See S. G., “Exclusion of Witnesses for Unbelief,” 1:349 n.1; Cushing, The Right of
Universalists to Testify, 10; Samuel Howe, The Practice in Civil Actions and Proceedings at
Law, In Massachusetts (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1834), 254; Theron Metcalf, Digest of
the Cases Decided in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Boston: Richard &
Lord, 1825), 132; and Joseph Story, “Evidence,” in Encyclopaedia Americana: A
Popular Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature, History, Politics and Biography, vol. 5,
ed. Francis Lieber (Philadelphia: Carey & Lea, 1831), 9. See also Thurston v. Whitney,
56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 104 (1848) (rejecting atheist testimony); and Commonwealth
v. Wyman & Robinson, Thacher Cr. 432 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1836) (same).
109. At the outset of his illustrious legal career, John Appleton of Maine—who staunchly
supported allowing Universalists and atheists as witnesses—explained that the court in
Hunscom “consider[ed] a disbelief in a future state of existence as an objection to the cred-
ibility—but the question was not decided on argument, and is contrary to the decisions in
England and New-York, and most other States in this country.” John Appleton, “On the
Admissibility of Atheists as Witnesses,” The Yankee; and Boston Literary Gazette
(Boston), June 11, 1829, 188. The editors of the Christian Spectator noted, albeit without
attribution, that they were “permitted, on the highest authority, to say that the Judges of
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts do not consider that note [of the Hunscom ruling] as
the record of a decision by which they feel themselves to be bound. The note was made
by the Reporter himself, and no written decision was given in that case by the court.”
“Review on the Exclusion of Infidels from Judicial Oaths,” 440 n.3.
110. See “Report Relating to Incompetency of Witnesses on Account of Religious
Belief,” 6 (“No person is rejected as an incompetent witness, who believes in a God who
will punish perjury, if he is otherwise competent. This has been the doctrine of our courts
since 1818”).
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testimony in 1822, although its reasoning was no more elaborate than the de
minimis treatment in Hunscom.111 The same year, a county court in
Maryland allowed a Universalist to testify.112 The court admitted the witness
after learning that he “always appealed to [the scriptures] as the bulwark of
his faith.”113 Compared with other published decisions, these rulings were
scattered and isolated. But early nineteenth-century reporting was limited,
so the decisions could be the tip of a broader, unrecorded shift in judicial
behavior. At a minimum, they highlight the agency that judges sometimes
exhibited in eschewing the usual religious prerequisites for oath taking.
Judges also used ambiguities in Universalist doctrine to avoid strict
adherence to competency rules. Having decided Jackson v. Gridley in
1820, the New York Supreme Court re-examined witness exclusion a
few years later in Butts v. Swartwood.114 A witness had apparently
announced “that he did not believe in the bible more than in any other his-
tory . . . but he at the same time declared that he believed in the Deity, and
in the doctrine of universal salvation.”115 Without conclusive evidence of
disqualifying beliefs, the trial judge allowed him to testify. The state’s
highest court affirmed, finding “no evidence in this case, to shew what pre-
cise creed is embraced in the doctrine of universal salvation.” The court
noted that not “all those who hold that doctrine. . . deny all future punish-
ment. Some only deny the duration of those punishments to be eternal.”116
Indeed, there was a lively debate within Universalist circles as to whether
God temporarily punished sin.117
B. Reinterpreting the Common Law
In 1824, only a year after Butts v. Swartwood, a New York lower court
issued the first reported decision directly rejecting the authority of
Atkyns’s report of Omichund. In a criminal trial for perjury, the prosecutor,
Raymond Williams, took the stand as a government witness. The defendant
objected to Williams’s competency and offered a witness who “testified
111. Noble v. People, 1 Ill. 54 (1822). On a separate issue, the court revealed a strikingly
liberal interpretation of competency requirements. Ibid., 56 (“If the witness be manifestly
biased by his interest, the jury can detect him”).
112. “An Extract from a Letter, dated Elkton, 4th April, 1822,” in The Philadelphia
Universalist Magazine and Christian Messenger, 2 vols., ed. Abner Kneeland
(Philadelphia: J. Young, 1822), 1:287.
113. Ibid.
114. Butts v. Swartwood, 2 Cow. 431 (N.Y. 1823).
115. Ibid., 432.
116. Ibid.
117. Bressler, The Universalist Movement in America, 46.
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that he had frequently heard the prosecutor declare, that he did not
believe in any future punishment, after this life.”118 Judge Reuben Hyde
Walworth—who 4 years later became chancellor, one of New York’s high-
est judicial officers—held that Williams should be allowed to testify:
If he does not believe in the existence of a God; or if he believes in no pun-
ishment except by human laws, no obligation or tie can have any binding
force upon his conscience. But if he believes that he will be punished by
his God even in this world, if he swears falsely, there is a binding tie upon
the conscience of the witness and he must be sworn; and the strength or
weakness of that tie is only proper to be taken into consideration in deciding
upon the degree of credit which is to be given to his testimony.119
The New York Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Jackson v. Gridley had
gone awry, Walworth argued, based on “the misreporting of the opinion
of Chief Justice Willes as delivered in the case of Omichund
v. Barker.”120
In 1827, a lower court in western South Carolina adopted and expanded
upon Judge Walworth’s reasoning. Drawing on nearly all available
sources, Chancellor Henry William DeSaussure found the common law
to be indeterminate based on the conflicting reports of Omichund and
the lack of a majority opinion in the earlier South Carolina decision of
State v. Petty.121 DeSaussure therefore returned to first principles. “It is
clear that the object of all evidence is the attainment of truth,” he wrote,
also noting that, “in modern times, the disposition of the Courts of
Justice has been to narrow the ground of incompetency, and to leave objec-
tions to operate on the credit of the witnesses.”122 Because the contested
witness believed in divine punishment, DeSaussure stated, “[i]t does
appear to me that this is a sufficient sanction to guarantee the attainment
118. People v. Matteson, 2 Cow. 433, 433 (N.Y. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1824) (italics in the
original).
119. Ibid., 433.
120. Ibid., 434. Judge Williams issued a similar opinion in an unnamed case. See 2 Cow.
572 (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1824).
121. Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 Car. L.J. 210. In Petty, two of the five justices of South
Carolina’s Constitutional Court had articulated the “well settled” common-law rule: “If one
called as a witness, does not believe in God, and a future state of rewards and punishments,
he cannot be sworn.” State v. Petty, 16 S.C.L. (Harp.) 59, 62 (1823) (Colcock, J.). In Petty,
the attorney for the state had argued that “the rule must be considered abrogated, by that part
of the constitution which guarantees the liberty of conscience.” Ibid. Justice Charles Colcock
summarily dismissed this argument, stating: “I have always regarded that as a wise provision
in the constitution; and shall never believe that it was intended to banish all religion; nor can
I permit myself to enter seriously into any arguments on a question which I most earnestly
hope will never be seriously entertained in these United States.” Ibid., 62–63.
122. Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 Car. L.J. 204, 206.
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of truth from a witness.”123 But “those who deny wholly the existence of a
God or Providence, or punishments in this or another world,” DeSaussure
emphasized, should not be admitted.124
The more pathbreaking aspect of DeSaussure’s opinion, however, was
his assessment of religious freedom. South Carolina’s constitution, like
New York’s, barred only “discrimination or preference” in the “[t]he
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship”; it did
not expressly prohibit legal disabilities imposed on account of religious
views.125 Opposing counsel therefore argued that “the inquiry into [the wit-
ness’s] religious opinions did not contravene . . . the Constitution [because]
he might still enjoy his religious profession, and worship notwithstanding
such exclusion, and that the exclusion would merely operate on his civil
and not his religious rights.”126 DeSaussure eloquently replied:
If a man’s religious opinions are made a ground to exclude him from the
enjoyment of civil rights, then he does not enjoy the freedom of his religious
profession and worship. His exclusion from being a witness in Courts of
Justice is a serious injury to him; it is also degrading to him and others
who think with him. . . . It would seem to me to be a mockery to say to
men, you may enjoy the freedom of your religious professions and worship;
but if you differ from us in certain dogmas and points of belief, you shall be
disqualified and deprived of the rights of a citizen, to which you would be
entitled but for those differences of religious opinion.127
Drawing on a sense of social progress, DeSaussure concluded: “I feel
strength in the view of the case by the growing liberality of the age, in
the respect shewn to the tenderness of conscience.”128 The decision was
appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals and affirmed without
comment.129
DeSaussure’s opinion was pioneering as a judicial pronouncement, but
similar expositions of religious freedom were increasingly common in
the public sphere. For decades, many Americans opposed religious tests
123. Ibid., 210.
124. Ibid., 211.
125. S.C. Constitution of 1790, art. VIII, § 1.
126. Ibid., 212. For the opposing counsel’s argument, see “Mr. Chestney’s Speech Before
the Hon. Chancellor Desaussure,” South Carolina State Gazette (Columbia), May 24 and 31,
1828.
127. Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 Car. L.J. 212.
128. Ibid., 213 (citing, although not by name, People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess.
1813), in William Sampson, The Catholic Question in America [New York: Edward
Gillespy, 1813]). See also Walter J. Walsh, “The First Free Exercise Case,” George
Washington Law Review 73 (2004): 41.
129. Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 Car. L.J. 214.
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for officeholders on the basis that burdensome civil incapacities prevented
the practice of religion from being truly “free.”130 And politicians were
beginning to make similar arguments against the common-law competency
rule. At the 1821 state constitutional convention in Albany, following
shortly after the New York Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson
v. Gridley, state legislator Erastus Root proposed that courts should not
“exclude any witness on account of his religious faith.”131 Root instead
“wished for freedom of conscience,” disallowing witnesses from being
“interrogated and catechised as to their articles of faith.”132 Root’s idea,
however, garnered almost no support.133 It is worth noting that much of
the public commentary following Gridley defended the ruling, including
Spencer’s reliance on the Atkyns report in Omichund.134
Following the 1821 convention, citizens in several New York localities
petitioned for legislative change. An assembly in Whitesborough, for
example, adopted resolutions claiming that the Gridley decision had
unconstitutionally endorsed sectarian doctrine.135 The citizens proposed
that “the right of testifying in courts of justice is one of the most important
130. See, for example, Oliver Ellsworth, “To the Landholders and Farmers, Number VII,”
Connecticut Courant (Hartford), December 17, 1787, 1 (arguing that “a good and peaceable
citizen” should be “liable to no penalties or incapacities on account of his religious senti-
ments”); and Journal of Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of Delegates Chosen
to Revise the Constitution of Massachusetts (Boston: Daily Advertiser, 1821), 83 (remarks
of James Prince) (arguing that natural liberty is abridged whenever “the consciences of
men are in any wise shackled by forms or qualifications”).
131. Nathaniel H. Carter, William L. Stone, and Marcus T.C. Gould, eds., Reports of the
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1821, Assembled for the Purpose of
Amending the Constitution of the State of New York (Albany, NY: E. & E. Hosford,
1821), 462.
132. Ibid., 463.
133. Root quickly withdrew his first proposal, see ibid., 464, and the following day, he
proposed that “no witness shall be questioned as to his religious faith.” Ibid., 465. Root
seems to have been worried about competency and credibility challenges. See ibid. (arguing
against the rule that a witness “must agree to some particular tenets, otherwise he is excluded
from being a witness, or the jury are informed, that he is an incredible witness, and his tes-
timony is not to be believed”). The delegates defeated the proposal by a vote of 94 to 8 after
Chancellor Kent deemed it to be “unworthy of notice.” Ibid., 466.
134. See, for example, Q.E.D., “To the Editors of the Argus,” Albany Argus, January 8,
1822, 3; and Q.E.D., “Messrs. Editors,” Albany Argus, December 25, 1821, 2. See also
William Craig Brownlee, A Dissertation on the Nature, Obligations, and Form of a Civil
Oath (New York: Wilder & Campbell, 1825), 18.
135. “Meeting at Whitesborough” [Jan. 24, 1822], in Thomas Herttell, The Demurrer: Or,
Proofs of Error in the Decision of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Requiring
Faith in Particular Religious Doctrines as a Legal Qualification of Witnesses; Thence
Establishing by Law a Religious Test and a Religious Creed (New York: E. Conrad,
1828), 145–46.
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civil rights of the citizens of this state; and that no citizen can be deprived
of this right, unless by the law of the land on the judgment of his peers.”136
At least one New York legislator agreed. Thomas Herttell, a legislative
champion of many liberal causes, wrote in his 156 page attack on
Gridley that the judges “have discriminated between the religious tenets
of different individuals of the community, and imposed disabilities on
those whose opinions they have undertaken to proscribe by law.”137
Notably, Herttell did not argue that juries should be allowed to assess a
witness’s credibility based on his religious views. The pursuit of truth,
Herttell argued, “was no justification for the court, nor would it be for
any jury to intermeddle in a concern in which the court admitted . . . that
‘no human tribunal had a right to interfere.’”138
C. Defending Incompetency
As the 1820s progressed, reports of testimonial exclusions became increas-
ingly common, and notably more controversial. At the fore of these devel-
opments was a trio of rulings in Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York.
These three decisions, along with the debates that erupted in their after-
maths, expose both the escalating importance of religion-based compe-
tency rules as a salient public issue and the ways that reformers were
adapting their arguments.
In 1827, the Circuit Court of the United States for the First Circuit, sit-
ting as a trial court in Providence, Rhode Island, considered an objection to
two plaintiff’s witnesses—father and son Joseph and John Richardson—on
the basis of religious defect. A defense witness testified “that he knew the
[Richardsons] well, that he had often heard the son say, that he did not
believe in the existence of a God, or of a future state,”139 and that the father
had declared “that he did not believe in a future state; that he had read Tom
Paine’s works; and did not know, whether he (the father) believed any
thing.” Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story—who was riding circuit—
announced the court’s ruling: “We think these persons are not competent
witnesses. Persons who do not believe in the existence of a God, or of a
future state, or who have no religious belief, are not entitled to be sworn
136. Ibid., 146. See also “Report of the Judiciary Committee, on Petition from Monroe
County,” Watch-Tower (Cooperstown, NY), June 9, 1823, 2.
137. Herttell, The Demurrer, 6 (emphasis omitted).
138. Ibid., 84 (emphasis added).
139. Wakefield v. Ross, 5 Mason 16, 18n*, 28 F. Cas. 1346, 1347n2 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827)
(No. 17,050). Mason’s report was published in 1831 and was the most frequently cited report
of the case.
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as witnesses.”140 In light of existing authority, Story’s decision was
unsurprising.
One year later in Atwood v. Welton,141 the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut held a Universalist incompetent to testify in the most erudite
opinion of its kind. Canvassing most of the appellate case law, Justice
David Daggett—who had argued as counsel in Curtiss v. Strong—men-
tioned the ambiguity in the Omichund opinions but stated confidence in
Atkyns’s report.142 The rule requiring belief in future rewards and punish-
ments, he asserted on behalf of the majority, “is the rule of common law;
and there is no adjudged case, nor hardly a dictum in the English books
against it.”143
Daggett acknowledged that “a man ought not to be questioned respect-
ing his religious opinions, as the enquiry may subject him to reproach, if he
should confess his infidelity.”144 Admitting prior out-of-court statements,
however, obviated religious-liberty concerns. “[I]t is not easy to see how
there is any interference with religious faith,” he wrote, “in deciding a per-
son professing certain opinions to be unfit to be sworn.”145 Excluding a
witness from testifying, he stated, “has no possible bearing” on his belief
or worship. Restating and responding to the rights-based argument,
Daggett continued: “But his rights are infringed, or he is disturbed in the
exercise and enjoyment of them. What right? Doubtless the right of giving
testimony. This is a new right, privilege or franchise, unknown, and there-
fore, undefined, and I may add, unheard of before, by any lawyer or
judge. . . . The party [in the suit] may be injured . . . but it is incomprehen-
sible how the proposed witnesses can be, in any way affected.”146
140. Ibid. Justice Story continued: “The administration of an oath supposes, that a moral
and religious accountability is felt to a Supreme Being, and is the sanction which the law
requires upon the conscience of a person, before it admits him to testify.” Ibid. After the
decision, there was some debate about whether Story thought the witnesses were incompe-
tent as atheists, or as Universalists. See, for example, “Litchfield Decision,” Trumpet and
Universalist Magazine, October 18, 1828, 1 (“The public mind was much agitated about
the close of the year 1827, by a misreport of a decision . . . by Mr. Justice Story. It was
at first supposed that the two witnesses, father and son, were rejected for want of belief in
the doctrine of future rewards and punishments”); and “Competency of Witnesses,”
Trumpet and Universalist Magazine, September 14, 1833, 2 (“Judge Story, we believe, is
misrepresented. It was an atheist to who he objected”).
141. Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66 (1828).
142. Ibid., 75 (“Atkyns furnished the case from the judges themselves, and when the deci-
sion was pronounced. With his accuracy as a reporter, it is not credible, that he should have
omitted what is now deemed important in the opinion of Willes”).
143. Ibid., 74.
144. Ibid., 73.
145. Ibid., 77.
146. Ibid., 78.
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Anticipating the logical conclusion of the rights-based argument, Daggett
asserted that “if the witness who denies all future punishment, cannot be
excluded, without a violation of the constitution, neither can the
Atheist.”147
One of the many interesting features of Atwood is the creative theolog-
ical arguments made on both sides. Responding to the plaintiff’s conten-
tion that the common-law rule would exclude a Calvinist who was “fully
assured of his own election to eternal life,” Daggett embraced the point,
stating that “if it should be proved respecting any person offered as a wit-
ness, that he believed his own happiness secure at death regardless of his
conduct in this life, he ought not to be sworn.”148 But Daggett did not
directly respond to the plaintiff’s argument that courts always accepted tes-
timony from Jews, “whose ideas of a future state are known to be very
indistinct and loose.”149 Aside from this remark, the potential tension
between Jewish theology and the strict common-law rule played almost
no role in the legal and political debates about witness competency.150
Advocates of reform more frequently mentioned the Catholic belief in
absolution, which they argued exposed the hypocrisy of religious-based
tests. “What credit will be given, by a Protestant,” Justice John
Thompson Peters asked in dissent in Atwood, “to the testimony of a
Catholic with an indulgence in his pocket?”151
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid., 76. For similar arguments, see Bernard Whitman, “Letter II [November
1830],” in Two Letters to the Reverend Moses Stuart: On the Subject of Religious
Liberty, 2nd ed. (Boston: Gray & Bowen, 1831), 148–49; and J. F., “Dr. Ely—Orthodox
Party—Oaths,” Trumpet and Universalist Magazine, April 24, 1830, 1.
149. Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 69.
150. See note 49.
151. Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 85 (Peters, J., dissenting). See also Farnandis
v. Henderson, 1 Car. L.J. 211 (noting that strict application of the common-law rule
“may exclude Roman Catholics, who believe that punishments in another world may be
avoided altogether by absolution, or diminished by masses and prayer”); St. George
Tucker, Appendix to Volume First, Part Second, of Blackstone’s Commentaries
(Philadelphia: William Young Birch and Abraham Small, 1803), 9 (“Atheism destroys the
sacredness and obligation of an oath. But is there not also a religion (so called) which
does this, by teaching, that there is a power which can dispense with the obligations of
oaths; that pious frauds are right, and that faith is not to be kept with heretics”).
Interestingly, DeSaussure faced bitter criticism from the Catholic Bishop of Charleston for
misrepresenting Catholic doctrine. John England, Bishop of Charleston, “Mistakes: To the
Hon. Chancellor Desaussure,” Baltimore Gazette and Daily Advertiser, December 24,
1827, 2. Arguments about Jewish and Catholic theology were nearly always made in
favor of reform, not in favor of excluding Jews or Catholics. But see ibid. (noting an unsuc-
cessful attempt in York District, South Carolina, “to invalidate the testimony of the principal
witness for the prosecution, upon the ground that he was suspected of being a Roman cath-
olic”); and Commonwealth v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. 153, 156 (Mass. 1834) (argument of counsel,
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Another prominent witness-competency controversy arose in the late
1820s in New York. The episode stemmed from the 1826 kidnapping
and apparent murder of William Morgan by a group of Masons in retalia-
tion for his plan to reveal secrets of the Masonic order. At the August 1828
trial of several of Morgan’s alleged captors, the prosecution—led by
Ambrose Spencer’s son, John C. Spencer—planned to rely heavily on
the testimony of Edward Giddins (often reported as Giddings),152 but the
defense produced witnesses who said that Giddins “believed that con-
science alone controlled the actions of honest men, and denied the existence
of any being to whom man will be every accountable for his conduct.”153
Consequently, Judge Nathaniel Howell barred Giddins from testifying,
undercutting several of the prosecutions.154 Journalist William Leete
Stone later reported to John Quincy Adams, “The rejection of Giddings
as a witness, was a sore disappointment to the people. It was known . . .
that his testimony, if received, would be of the highest importance.”155
Tellingly, reactions to the trio of decisions in the late 1820s—Wakefield
v. Ross, Atwood v. Welton, and the William Morgan ruling—were far more
hostile than the responses to Jackson v. Gridley less than a decade earlier.
According to the Boston Patriot: “The decision of the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut . . . has called forth remarks of disapprobation
from almost every quarter. . . . Good will come out of this decision, how-
ever, as it will probably lead to the passage of a law to prevent the judiciary
rejected by the court, that “confession and absolution being parts of the Roman Catholic
faith, a witness belonging to that sect might testify what was not true, in the expectation
of afterwards obtaining absolution”).
152. The Giddins family seems to have used both spellings. See Edward Giddins to Henry
Giddings, January 28, 1824, Papers of Victory Birdseye, Livingston Masonic Library,
New York, NY.
153. Testimony of David Morisson, quoted in “Anti-Masonic Almanacs—Concluded,”
Republican Compiler (Gettysburg, PA), June 22, 1830, 2. This episode is summarized in
Ronald P. Formisano, For the People: American Populist Movements from the Revolution
to the 1850s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 136–39. At the
later trial in 1831, Judge Samuel Nelson permitted Giddins to testify based on prosecution
witnesses who testified that he believed in God. Trial of Parkhusrt [sic] Whitney, Timothy
Shaw, Noah Beach, William Miller, and Samuel M. Chubbuck; for a Conspiracy; the
Abduction, False Imprisonment, and Assault and Battery of William Morgan: Had at a
Special Circuit Court, Held at Lockport, Niagara County, Feb. 1831 (Lockport, NY:
Balance Office, [1831]), 24 (hereafter Trial of Parkhurst Whitney).
154. William Leete Stone, Letters on Masonry and Anti-Masonry: Addressed to the Hon.
John Quincy Adams (New York: O. Halsted, 1832), 344. Morgan testified to the grand jury
but was “excluded from testifying on the trials of some of the parties implicated.” John
C. Spencer, Report of the Special Counsel on the Subject of the Abduction of William
Morgan, N.Y. Senate Report No. 67 (1830), 18.
155. Ibid., 347.
Testimonial Exclusions and Religious Freedom in Early America 463
from acting as inquisitors upon men’s religious belief, when summoned as
witnesses.”156 Indeed, pressure for legislative change was mounting.
Reform efforts within and across state lines seem to have been mostly
uncoordinated.157 Universalist magazines were the only steady, far-
reaching voice in favor of reform, although newspapers and law magazines
gave the issue considerable cross-state attention as well. This fragmented
effort, however, should not distract from well-defined trends in public
debate and lawmaking. Published cases, treatises, editorials, and legislative
debates all facilitated, and provide evidence of, fairly consistent patterns in
reformist rhetoric and goals.
Yet again, religious freedom was the most prevalent argument against
the common-law competency rule. That rule, one editorial in Rhode
156. “Intolerance,” Boston Patriot & Mercantile Advertiser, July 15, 1828, 2.
Commentators were sometimes simultaneously critical of the common-law rule but not
the judicial decisions themselves. See “Religious Test Applied to Witnesses,”
Rhode-Island American (Providence), November 20, 1827, 2 (“rejecting a witness for not
believing in future rewards and punishments, is undoubtedly correct according to the absurd
doctrines of the common law”); and Norwich Courier (CT), July 16, 1828, 2 (stating that the
holding of Atwood v. Welton “is not, we understand, a new point, which was adjudged” but
“has been settled law in Connecticut, for very many years”).
157. My search has been mostly unavailing. The papers of two leading reformers reveal
almost no discussion of efforts to eliminate testimonial exclusions. From 1827 through 1832
—a period inclusive of his most active reform efforts—Millard Fillmore’s unpublished
papers show only two letters discussing testimonial exclusions. In the first letter, a constit-
uent lauded Fillmore for proposing that “professed atheism apply to only the credibility of
witnesses in our courts of justice, & not to their competency.” Exclusion of atheists, he
wrote, “is now unfortunately connected with political considerations that will prove an obsta-
cle to its dispassionate consideration.” A. B. Johnson to Millard Fillmore, January 29, 1831,
Microfilm Edition of the Millard Fillmore Papers, Series 1, Reel 1. In another letter, Philo
C. Fuller—a New York legislator and later congressman—wrote to Fillmore: “I get your
Essays on abolishing the religious test—and regularly read, cut out & preserve them: a com-
pliment I have paid to very few productions which have come to hand this winter.”
P. C. Fuller to Millard Fillmore, February 26, 1832, Microfilm Edition of the Millard
Fillmore Papers, Series 1, Reel 2. Gideon Welles’s papers from 1827 through 1830 reveal
almost no discussion of witness-competency rules despite his introduction of a reform bill
in the Connecticut legislature. One correspondent wrote: “I am not a universalist in faith
or profession, but in the doctrine of evidence lately recognized I see much to alarm the peo-
ple of this state. As a lawyer I aprobate the doctrine—as an advocate for the rights & liberty
of man, nay as a christian I see in it much to deplore—But all things work for good. The
promulgation of the doctrine here has (I speak within bounds) added thirty substantial
names to the Jackson cause.” Asa Child to Gideon Welles, July 9, 1828, Gideon Welles
Papers, Library of Congress. A few months later, one of Welles’s Jacksonian correspondents
reiterated the decision’s political usefulness: “The Litchfield decision has been particularly
beneficial.” Andrew T. Judson to Gideon Welles, October 11, 1828, Gideon Welles Papers,
Library of Congress. Welles’s correspondence, including the collection in the New York
Public Library, does not illuminate his subsequent efforts to reform the law.
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Island stated, “seems to be requiring of the witness that he shall believe in
certain prescribed doctrines, in other words a direct attempt to set up a reli-
gious test.”158 Countless others made the same point.159
Although this argument easily resonates with modern readers, it is
important to recognize its contestability at the time.160 Legal equality
had long been one of many facets of religious freedom that could supple-
ment the natural right of free exercise, but reformers in the 1820s and
1830s were, perhaps unwittingly, collapsing these concepts into an undif-
ferentiated whole. To put the point another way, the struggle over compe-
tency rules was pulling the right of free exercise away from its originally
more limited focus on liberty. Reformers were equating the denial of
legal privileges with the deprivation of natural rights.
In states that recognized civil equality, much of the debate focused on
whether testifying was a civil right. Judicial decisions and early commen-
tary were generally hostile to the idea. In 1828, for example, Massachusetts
legislator and future United States Attorney General Caleb Cushing wrote:
[T]he phrase ‘civil capacities’ in the [religious freedom] act, has no applica-
tion . . . to the qualifications of a witness. These qualifications are a matter of
adversary right. Every party to a cause has a right to demand a trial by the
established rules of evidence. . . . The court cannot, for the purpose of protect-
ing the reputation or saving the feelings of the witness, deny to the defendant
the exercise of this right.161
158. “Religious Test Applied to Witnesses,” Rhode-Island American (Providence),
November 20, 1827, 2.
159. See, for example, D. Pickering, “Reply to Mr. Cowell’s ‘Card,’” Providence Patriot,
December 1, 1827, 2 (“[D]oes not a witness suffer, by being proscribed as unworthy of
credit, merely because he cannot conscientiously subscribe to a certain religious tenet . . .
?”); J. F., “Dr. Ely—Orthodox Party—Oaths,” Trumpet and Universalist Magazine, April
24, 1830, 1 (“[T]o guarantee to one man the privilege of being a witness under oath,
while you withhold it from another whose moral character is equally good, creates an
inequality, and gives one a legal pre-eminence over the other”); and Appleton, “On the
Admissibility of Atheists as Witnesses,” 188 (“Government has no right to interfere with
the religions of its citizens—it is entirely a question between them and their God”). These
arguments were often explicitly pitched in constitutional terms. See, for example,
“Senate,” Connecticut Courant (Hartford), June 8, 1830, 2 (remarks of Samuel Hart and
Lorrain Pease) (criticizing Atwood as “unconstitutional”).
160. See, for example, “Review of the Controversy, respecting Judge Story’s Late
Decision,” Rhode-Island Religious Messenger (Providence), December 7, 1827, 3 (denounc-
ing the view that because individuals “are at liberty to exercise [religion], without encroach-
ing the province of our neighbors, . . . [and] believe as they choose, that, ergo, all opinions
are equally good, by the laws of both God and man”).
161. Cushing, The Right of Universalists to Testify, 21. See also “For the Courier,”
Norwich Courier (CT), July 16, 1828, 2–3; “Of the Controversy Respecting Judge
Story’s Late Decision,” 142. Similarly, William Leete Stone wrote to John Quincy
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For Cushing, the only rights at stake were those of the competing parties,
not prospective witnesses, and the rules of evidence defined those rights.
A review in the Christian Spectator agreed, noting that “[a] man can be
wronged only by being deprived on some right. But the right to offer tes-
timony in a given case, belongs to the contending parties, and to no one
else.” Witnesses had “obviously no rights.”162
These arguments, however, had started to lose their persuasiveness.163
The law, many now thought, was demeaning people based solely on their
religious beliefs, placing honest men “on a level with a man convicted of
forgery or any infamous crime.”164 Depriving Universalists of otherwise
available civil rights, Bernard Whitman wrote in 1830, constituted a
form of “punishment” that was “wholly subversive of religious liberty.”165
Indeed, rejected witnesses did not take kindly to their exclusions. Still bit-
ter about being rejected in 1828 “for exercising a privilege guaranteed by
the constitutions of our country,” Edward Giddins asked the New York
prosecutor not to call upon him again. “To again suffer my feelings to
be wantonly sported with, without a prospect of being able to benefit
the public with my testimony,” Giddins wrote, “is more than I think
that public ought to ask, and more than I can persuade myself to submit
to.”166
Reformers also increasingly realized that denying the testimony of cer-
tain groups could, in effect, place those groups beyond the “protection of
the law,” leaving them without effective recourse to infringements of their
Adams that “the court were clearly right in rejecting [Giddins], both by the principles of the
constitution and the common law.” Stone, Letters on Masonry and Anti-Masonry, 348. In
support, Stone cited Jackson v. Gridley and the subsequent debates in New York’s 1821 con-
vention. Ibid., 348–49. Adams surely agreed, explaining in a floor debate in Congress in
1840 that “it is a well known principle of the common law that a man who avows his
own disbelief of this responsibility, who denies the existence of a God, or his own liability
to account in a future world for any falsehood of his oath before a court of justice on earth,
thereby becomes incompetent to testify in courts of law.” “House of Representatives,” Daily
National Intelligencer, June 16, 1840, 2.
162. “Review on the Exclusion of Infidels from Judicial Oaths,” Christian Spectator,
September 1829, 447. Later, the reviewer explained: “Every man in a court of justice has
a right to be tried by those rules, strike where they may. Nor can courts deprive him of
the exercise of this right, by the consideration that in so doing, they may affect the reputation
of any third person who is offered as a witness.” Ibid., 451.
163. See, for example, notes 158, 159, 177, 230, 274, and 275.
164. “Religious Test Applied to Witnesses,” Rhode-Island American (Providence),
November 20, 1827, 2.
165. Bernard Whitman, “Letter II [November 1830],” in Two Letters to the Reverend Moses
Stuart: On the Subject of Religious Liberty, 2nd ed. (Boston: Gray & Bowen, 1831), 151.
166. Edward Giddins to Victory Birdseye, June 16, 1830, Papers of Victory Birdseye.
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private rights.167 Even Cushing, who had defended the judges, noted that
“[i]t would afford just ground of reproach against the law . . . if a numerous
and respectable body of Christians were, by law, incompetent to give evi-
dence in a court of justice.”168 Notably, however, these claims about the
“protection of the law” were tied to the inability of atheists to vindicate
their other rights in court; they do not necessarily suggest an incipient prin-
ciple against class-based legislation.169
In addition to making constitutional arguments, many writers questioned
the evidentiary value of excluding Universalists from testifying. The
Universalist Magazine proclaimed that requiring belief in future rewards
and punishments “involves the revolting notion that the more unmerciful
and cruel we believe our Maker to be, the more likely we shall be to
speak the truth in evidence.”170 A letter to the American Mercury echoed
this sentiment: “He, whose soul needs to be grasped with the terrors of hell,
before he can tell the truth, is surely so abandoned, that hell itself could not
prevent his perjury.”171
The backlash to Wakefield v. Ross, Atwood v. Welton and the William
Morgan affair in New York exposed increasing public disillusionment
with the propriety and constitutionality of the common-law rule. The
Atwood decision, one Connecticut legislator declared, “had produced
167. See, for example, Herttell, The Demurrer, 24–25 (“By being thus deprived of the
right or privilege of taking an oath, he is debarred the means of personal safety placed
out of the pale of legal protection . . . as if proceedings and judgment of outlawry were
had and given against him”); J. F., “Dr. Ely—Orthodox Party—Oaths,” Trumpet and
Universalist Magazine, April 24, 1830, 1 (“[Y]ou cannot more seriously molest a man,
than by depriving him of the dearest privilege of a freeman, and placing him beyond the pro-
tection of the laws”); and “Connecticut Legislature,” Connecticut Journal, June 15, 1830, 2
(remarks of John Gray) (“[T]he penalty, by a recent decision, is no less than disfranchise-
ment, and outlawry for difference in opinion in religious matters”).
168. Cushing, The Right of Universalists to Testify, 3. In later prosecutions relating to the
William Morgan affair, and after New York changed its law, Judge Samuel Nelson
apparently stated that because a competency objection “was in its nature penal as to the wit-
ness, . . . it ought most clearly to be made out.” Trial of Parkhurst Whitney, 24.
169. For a historical defense of the view that the Equal Protection Clause originally for-
bade all sorts of improper classifications, see Melissa L. Saunders, “Equal Protection, Class
Legislation, and Colorblindness,” Michigan Law Review 96 (1997): 245–337. For a rebuttal
of this argument and defense of the view that the Equal Protection Clause originally guar-
anteed only equal governmental protection of private rights, see Christopher R. Green, “The
Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History,” Civil Rights Law
Journal 19 (2008): 45–71.
170. “For the Universalist Magazine,” Universalist Magazine (Boston), March 15, 1828, 1.
171. “Review on the Exclusion of Infidels from Judicial Oaths,” American Mercury
(Hartford, CT), December 8, 1829, 3.
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astonishment and regret throughout the community.”172 This comment is
borne out by the rapid success of legislative reform efforts.173 Spurred
by public outcry, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York all quickly
enacted legislation amending their competency requirements. In Rhode
Island, a bill allowing both Universalists and atheists to testify passed hast-
ily with only five dissenting votes.174 This result is not surprising given the
state’s long-standing history of broad religious freedom without an estab-
lished church and the lack of any noticeable public opposition to the leg-
islative change.175 A less drastic reform proved more controversial in
Connecticut.
Debates in the Connecticut House of Representatives were well recorded
and expose persistent divisions over the meaning and importance of oath
requirements and their constitutionality. When considering a bill on reli-
gious freedom, Andrew T. Judson “offered an amendment declaratory of
the spirit of the constitution, and providing that no person’s religious belief
shall affect his admissibility to an oath, or his credibility as a witness.”176
172. “Connecticut Legislature,” The Hartford Times, June 8, 1829, 3 (remarks of Samuel
Hart).
173. See, for example, ibid. (remarks of Robert Fairchild (“[T]he Legislature should settle
the question. The public mind was greatly agitated”). See also note 156.
174. The act, passed on January 19, 1828, and entitled “An act declaratory of the laws of
this State, relating to freedom of opinion in matters of religion,” provided:
Be it enacted, by the General Assembly, and by authority thereof it is enacted, That by the law of
this state, “all men are free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of
religion; and that the same do not in any wise diminish, enlarge or affect their civil rights or
capacities;” and that no man’s opinions, in matters of religion, his belief or disbelief, can be
legally inquired into, or be made a subject of investigation, with a view to his qualifications
to hold office or give testimony, by any man or men, acting judicially or legislatively. (Public
Laws Of the State of Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, passed since the session of
the General Assembly, in January, A. D. 1827 [Providence, RI, 1829], 668–69).
The vote total is reported in “General Assembly,” Rhode-Island Republican (Newport),
January 24, 1828, 1.
175. One writer expressed concern at the “vulgar and personal abuse” against Justice
Story stemming from a “hyper-zeal for the integrity of our religious freedom.” “Of the
Controversy Respecting Judge Story’s Late Decision,” Rhode-Island Religious Messenger,
December 7, 1827, 3. But newspaper commentary in Rhode Island was overwhelmingly
hostile to the decision.
176. “Connecticut Legislature,” The Hartford Times, June 8, 1829, 2 (remarks of Andrew
T. Judson); see also ibid. (remarks of Samuel Hart) (“The Constitution admitted of no ambi-
guity in regard to religious rights; but that instrument in his opinion had been misconstrued
by three of the Judges of the highest Court of Judicature in the State; and it was the duty of
the Legislature to interfere”); and ibid. (remarks of Robert Fairchild) (arguing that the
common-law rule was unconstitutional, and mentioning Chancellor DeSaussure’s decision
in South Carolina). Judson remarked that “[t]he original bill had regard to the right of ques-
tioning a witness as to his religious belief.” Ibid.
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The Atwood court’s denial that religious rights were at stake was
“delusive,” Judson asserted. “If you exclude one christian sect, and take
from them their civil rights, as such, the other sects are of course
preferred.”177
Many Connecticut representatives defended the constitutionality and
efficacy of the existing rules. Edmond Fanton stated that the common-
law rule “gave no preference to one sect over another; it had reference
solely to individual disabilities. The oath of a witness was founded on a
belief in future rewards and punishments; and a contrary decision would
destroy the obligation of an oath.”178 Others warned that the bill would
allow atheists to testify,179 an argument that led at least two representatives
to deny that any atheists lived in Connecticut.180
A resolution was reached with an amendment to allow testimony from
“every one, and give it that credibility which was due to it.”181 By impli-
cation, the responsibility for determining a witness’s credibility would be
in the hands of the jury. As Samuel Church argued, “The object of law
should be to elicit and elucidate truth, which cannot be done by rejecting
testimony. Every one should be allowed to tell his story, and the Court and
Jury permitted to inquire into his religious belief and place their own esti-
mate upon his credibility.”182 In response, future Connecticut Governor
177. Ibid. (remarks of Andrew T. Judson). Chauncey Cleaveland, who opposed “that any
Court should reject a Universalist, or a man of any other denomination, on account of his
religious opinions,” speculated that the common-law rule might “exclude an eighth or a
fourth part of the community.” Ibid.
178. Ibid. (remarks of Edmond Fanton). See also ibid. (remarks of Jared Griswold) (“The
Constitution did not compel any man to worship God contrary to the dictates of his con-
science. He may belong to what denomination he chooses; but it recognizes the God of
Christians; and the oath of a witness is an appeal to that Being”).
179. Ibid. (remarks of Jared Griswold, David S. Boardman, and Samuel Church).
180. Ibid. (remarks of Asa Wilcox and Chauncey Cleaveland). Erastus Root made a sim-
ilar remark at the 1821 convention in New York, see Reports of the Proceedings and
Debates of the Convention of 1821, 465, and the same argument reappeared in
Connecticut the following year, see “Senate,” Connecticut Courant (Hartford), June 8,
1830, 2 (remarks of Elisha Haley).
181. “Connecticut Legislature,” The Hartford Times, June 8, 1829, 2 (remarks of Samuel
Church). The amendment passed narrowly by a vote of 95 to 80. Ibid.; and “Connecticut
Legislature,” Connecticut Courant (Hartford), June 9, 1829, 1. The final bill passed by a
vote of 114 to 66. Ibid. The Times reported 65 votes against, and the Courant reported
67 votes against. The individual votes add up to 66.
182. “Connecticut Legislature,” The Hartford Times, June 8, 1829, 2 (remarks of Samuel
Church).
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Chauncey Cleaveland protested that allowing credibility inquiries “would
permit one party to array the prejudices of a Jury against a witness, by
an inquiry into his religious opinions.”183 The bill was stalled in the
Senate,184 but just a year later the General Assembly passed a law provid-
ing: “No person, who believes in the existence of a Supreme Being, shall,
on account of his religious opinions, be adjudged an incompetent witness
by any court of judicature in this State.”185 The bill passed overwhelm-
ingly, with some supporters of reform evidently voting “nay” because its
protections did not extend to atheists.186
These debates reflect unmistakable changes in popular opinion. In
1809, the restrictive decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors in Curtiss v. Strong had elicited little public comment. And follow-
ing Jackson v. Gridley, a reform effort in the 1821 New York constitu-
tional convention went nowhere.187 By the end of that decade, however,
the legislatures in both Connecticut and New York voted to eliminate
Universalist incompetency.188 Legislative records in Connecticut show
183. Ibid. (remarks of Chauncey Cleaveland). See also Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 85
(Peters, J., dissenting) (“The jury have none but their own sectarian prejudices”).
184. “Religious Freedom,” The Hartford Times, November 2, 1829, 2.
185. “An Act to Secure to the Citizens of this State Freedom of Opinion in Matters of
Religion,” in The Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut: Compiled in
Obedience to a Resolve of the General Assembly, Passed May, Eighteen Hundred and
Thirty-Eight (Hartford: John L. Boswell, 1839), 502. The bill passed in the Senate by a
vote of 14 to 6, after the Senate rejected by a vote of 14 to 5 a motion to strike the
words “who believes in the existence of a Supreme Being.” See “Senate,” Connecticut
Courant (Hartford), June 8, 1830, 2; and Religious Inquirer (Hartford), June 5, 1830, 125.
186. “Connecticut Legislature,” Connecticut Journal (New Haven), June 15, 1830, 2.
Some votes are not reported in the newspaper but are recorded in the journal of House of
Representatives at the Connecticut State Archives. Proponents of reform who voted against
the bill included John Gray, Thomas Mussey, and Gideon Welles.
187. See note 133.
188. For the Connecticut law, see note 185. For the New York law, see “Of the
Administration of Oaths and Affirmations,” in The Revised Statutes of the State of
New-York, Passed During the Years One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-Seven,
and One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-Eight, 3 vols. (Albany, NY: Packard &
Van Benthuysen, 1829), 2:407–8. Unfortunately, a lack of recorded debates in New York
limits an opportunity to tell a detailed story of that state’s transition to a more liberal com-
petency regime, an effort spearheaded by John C. Spencer, the special prosecutor in the
William Morgan trials. But there are snippets of useful information. On October 9, 1828,
for example—just 1 month after the first round of William Morgan trials—the New York
House of Representatives considered a bill passed by the Senate allowing atheists to testify.
Journal of the Assembly of the State of New-York, at their Fifty-first Session, Second Meeting
(Albany, NY: E. Croswell, 1828), 34. By a margin of 44 to 33, the House voted to replace
this provision with one providing that “Every person believing in the existence of a Supreme
Being who will punish false swearing, shall be admitted to be sworn, if otherwise compe-
tent.” Ibid. See also Formisano, For the People, 136–38; and John C. Spencer, Notes on
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that many opponents of reform in 1829 switched their votes just a year
later.189
Changing views about theology, religious freedom, and evidence law
had thus collided, with lasting consequences for American law. In fact,
Wakefield v. Ross and Atwood v. Welton proved to be the last formally
reported decisions that excluded Universalist witnesses because of their
religious beliefs.190
Behind these developments were broader shifts in the relationship of
government and religion, and particularly the formal disestablishment of
state-sponsored religion across the United States. Examining that transition
in any depth is beyond the scope of this article, but attitudes about how
governments should promote or draw upon religion were surely influential
in shaping the perspectives of the judges, legislators, and other public com-
mentators. Although reformers did not highlight disestablishment as a free-
standing reason to eliminate religion-based competency rules—that is,
the Revised Statutes of the State of New York . . . (Albany, NY: Websters and Skinners,
1830), 167–68 (noting the reform, without comment).
189. Out of fourteen representatives who voted “nay” in 1829 who also cast a vote in
1830, half of them switched their votes.
190. For cases allowing Universalist testimony, see, for example, United States
v. Kennedy, 3 McLean 175, 26 F.Cas. 761 (C.C.D. Ill. 1843) (No. 15,524); and Blocker
v. Burness, 2 Ala. 354 (1841). An 1835 committee report reveals that competency require-
ments evolved similarly in Vermont, notwithstanding the lack of reported cases. Journal of
the General Assembly of the State of Vermont at Their Session Begun and Holden at
Montpelier, in the County of Washington, on Thursday, October 8, 1835 (Middlebury:
Knapp & Jewett, 1835), 207. In a brief opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court of Errors
and Appeals stated that “there can be no sanction for an oath without a belief in a future
state,” but the excluded witness was an atheist. Perry v. Stewart, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 37
(1835). One later decision in New Jersey required belief in a state of future punishments
in order to admit a dying declaration, but that case was about the rationale of a hearsay
exception, not the requirements of judicial oaths. Donnelly v. State, 26 N.J.L. 463 (1857).
In 1841, a Georgia trial court excluded three Universalist witnesses, explaining that it
“did not exclude the witnesses on the ground of their being Universalists, but on the prin-
ciple of the common law, that makes the belief in a future state of rewards and punishments
the test as to the competency of witness objected to on the ground of religious belief.”
“Judge Andrews’ Decision in the Case of the State v. D. Patton, in Oglethorpe Superior
Court, April Term, 1841,” Macon Weekly Telegraph, August 3, 1841, 2. The judge firmly
denied that any civil rights were at issue, explaining that “[t]he witnesses were not proposing
to take an oath to interpose a claim, to qualify themselves to hold an office, or to assert any
other of their civil rights,” and that “[i]f a duty which a man may be compelled to form, and
which he cannot perform, unless permitted, regardless of his wishes, be his right, then is the
English language incapable of representing distinct ideas.” Ibid. Interestingly, Andrews also
quoted a Georgia statute that governed the competency of witnesses “on the trial of slaves or
free persons of color, which declares that ‘any witness shall be sworn, who believes in a God
and a future state of rewards and punishments.’” Ibid.
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religion-based competency rules apparently did not “establish” a state reli-
gion—they often referred to notions of progress and generational excep-
tionalism that echoed antiestablishment principles. Chancellor
DeSaussure’s appeal to “the growing liberality of the age,” for instance,
drew upon broader changes in the role of religion in American public
life.191
Partisan politics, too, influenced the reform efforts. The ruling in the
William Morgan case, for example, took on a partisan valence because
of the bitter, even violent, hostility between Masons and Anti-Masons.
In this instance, the Anti-Masonic opponents of religion-based exclusions
were allied with the Whigs.192 In other states, however, the Jacksonian
Democrats—the party that tended to have the support of Universalists—
were more supportive of removing religion-based competency rules.193
In Connecticut, for example, Democrats saw the fight against religion-
based exclusions as a wedge political issue that played in their favor.194
But although parties facilitated the ability of religious minorities to achieve
legislative reforms in particular states, religion-based competency rules
never became a national political issue.
Although historians often point to the interests of lawyers when account-
ing for various elements of early nineteenth-century legal reform,195 these
interests do not seem to have directly caused changes in religion-based
competency rules. In court, lawyers argued in favor of whatever rule ben-
efited their clients, and competency rules provided one of many avenues
for demonstrating their adversarial skill.196 In fact, the rise of lawyers
may have increased the use of competency rules.197
191. Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 Car. L.J. 213. See also, for example, “Connecticut
Legislature,” The Hartford Times, June 8, 1829, 2 (remarks of Robert Fairchild) (“[M]en
at the present day were growing more liberal in their sentiments”); and Thomas Cooper,
A Treatise on the Law of Libel and the Liberty of the Press: Showing the Origin, Use,
and Abuse of the Law of Libel (New York: G. F. Hopkins & Son, 1830), xvii (“All such
laws and decisions as cast a stigma of reproach or disability on any man for his opinions
on theological subjects . . . are laws and decision in favor of the alliance of church and
state”).
192. See Formisano, For the People, 136–38.
193. For Universalist political views, see Bressler, The Universalist Movement, 164 n.25.
It is worth emphasizing that these partisan trends were not uniform.
194. See note 157.
195. See, for example, Amalia D. Kessler, Inventing American Exceptionalism: The
Origins of American Adversarial Legal Culture, 1800–1877 (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2017), 9–10 (discussing this scholarly view).
196. The experience of New York lawyer Henry Vanderlyn provides a particularly rich
example. See note 267.
197. For one example of a lawyer identifying a competency problem unknown to the
judge, see note 106. Along the same lines, Kessler notes a “new and apparently lawyer-
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Out of court, too, attorney interests do not seem to have spurred reform
efforts. Lawyers, it turns out, were active voices on both sides of the issue.
In 1829, for example, a small minority of lawyers in the Connecticut House
of Representatives dominated debates over evidentiary reform.198 But these
ten attorneys divided their support equally. The bill ended up passing 114
to 65, but the vote among lawyers was 11 in favor and 13 against.
Information about partisan affiliation is unavailable, but county-level and
town-level data suggest that being a lawyer did not have much, if any,
effect on whether a Connecticut legislator favored evidence-law reform.199
In an indirect way, however, partisan developments and the assertion of
lawyers’ professional interests probably created a more hospitable political
environment for changing the common law. As John Witt has noted,
“reform in the law of evidence was linked to antebellum law reform gen-
erally, and codification in particular.”200 Indeed, reformers took full
driven focus on the admissibility of evidence, both oral and written,” in the second quarter of
the nineteenth century. Kessler, Inventing American Exceptionalism, 94.
198. About 70% of the speakers were lawyers. For the debates, see “Connecticut
Legislature,” The Hartford Times, June 8, 1829, 2. Lists of lawyers in Connecticut appear
in the five initial volumes of State Register of Civil, Judicial, Military, and Other Officers
in Connecticut (Hartford: John Russell, 1827–1830; H. & F. J. Huntington, 1831).
Overall, 31 of the 208 representatives in 1829 were lawyers. The lawyers who spoke
were David S. Boardman, Samuel Church, Chauncey F. Cleaveland, Robert Fairchild,
Jared Griswold, Charles Hawley, Andrew T. Judson, Phineas Miner, Timothy Pitkin, and
Ansel Sterling.
199. Lawyers were roughly the same proportion of each county’s delegation: Fairfield
(17%), Hartford (18%), Litchfield (16%), Middlesex (21%), New Haven (11%), New
London (12%), Tolland (5%), and Windham (19%). The data come from thirteen towns
with a lawyer and non-lawyer each voting. Of these, both representatives voted “yea” in
six instances (Berlin, Canterbury, Killingly, Newton, Salisbury, and Sharon), both represen-
tatives voted “nay” in six instances (Enfield, Guilford, Litchfield, New Milford, Somers, and
Winchester), and the lawyer voted “nay” and non-lawyer voted “yea” in three instances
(Cheshire, Colchester, and Lyme). No firm conclusions can be drawn, but these data do
not support an argument that lawyers disproportionately favored evidence-law reform.
The following year, thirteen of fifteen voting lawyers in the House of Representatives sup-
ported allowing Universalists to testify, but by that time reform was overwhelmingly popu-
lar, with a substantial portion of “nay” votes coming from proponents of reform who thought
that the bill did not go far enough. See note 186. Of the nine individuals who spoke during
the legislative debates in 1830, three were lawyers: Thaddeus Betts, John Holbrook, and
Romeo Lowrey. Voting patterns in the Senate were similar. See Religious Inquirer
(Hartford), June 5, 1830. The bill passed by a vote of 14 to 6, with at least five of the cham-
ber’s eight lawyers voting in favor. Two of the Senators, including lawyer Lorrain Pease,
voted “nay” because the bill was not liberal enough. See ibid.; and “Senate,” Connecticut
Courant (Hartford), June 8, 1830, 2.
200. Witt, “Making the Fifth,” 864 n.145. For a broader view of the codification move-
ment and its ties to the views of, and about, lawyers, see Norman W. Spaulding, “The
Luxury of the Law: The Codification Movement and the Right to Counsel,” Fordham
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advantage of contemporary suspicion of the common law. An editorial in
New York, for example, bemoaned that courts felt “bound, according to
‘common law,’ (i. e. unjust decisions,) to reject [an atheist’s] evidence.”
The common-law rule, the editorial explained, pitted “justice . . . in these
days of freedom” against “the fanaticism of our fathers, which ought to
have died with them.”201 This refrain about the “illiberality of the old
English common law” was repeated by many American reformers in
their efforts to change American law.202
III. Atheism
Allowing Universalists to testify was a substantial shift, but oaths nonethe-
less remained explicitly religious. The exclusion of atheists, Tapping Reeve
explained to his students in 1812, was “an unyielding rule of Law.”203 An
1828 treatise on oath requirements similarly declared that the rule was “laid
down without any qualification in all the books of evidence, and is admit-
ted in all the adjudged cases, where any question is raised concerning the
religious belief of a witness.”204 In fact, that year Rhode Island became the
first state to allow atheists to testify,205 but it was the exception to an oth-
erwise uniform rule.206
Efforts to relax oath requirements, however, did not stop with
Universalist testimony. Gradually, states loosened their competency rules
even further. In doing so, the original definition of oath taking grew
more distant.
Religious upheaval became rampant in the second quarter of the
nineteenth century, fueled largely by theological challenges from
Law Review 73 (2004): 984–91; and Charles M. Cook, The American Codification
Movement: A Study of Antebellum Legal Reform (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981).
201. “Progress of Liberal Principles,” The Correspondent, February 29, 1828, in George
Houston, The Correspondent, from January 26, 1828, to July 19, 1828 (New York: Houston
& Co., 1828), 3:90.
202. See, for example, John A. Bolles, “Qualifications of Witnesses,” Christian Review 4
(1836): 481 (“Now if an affirmation is as efficacious as an oath, in any case, why not adopt it
universally?”). See also, for example, “Connecticut Legislature,” Connecticut Journal (New
Haven), June 15, 1830, 2 (remarks of John Gray) (denouncing the “precedents of a barbarous
age”). For identification, see Formisano and Pickering, “The Christian Nation Debate and
Witness Competency,” 244.
203. Samuel Cheever, Lectures of Reeve and Gould, Litchfield Law School, 1812, 2:252,
MS 4010, Harvard Law School Library.
204. Cushing, The Right of Universalists to Testify, 9.
205. For the Rhode Island statute, see note 174.
206. See, for example, Norton v. Ladd, 4 N.H. 444 (1828).
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Universalists, increasing democratic individualism, widespread immigra-
tion and migration, cheaper publishing, and cyclical depressions.207 In
turn, many Americans became openly skeptical of established church doc-
trine. According to Christopher Grasso: “In the eighteenth century, the rare
religious skeptic tended to be a bewigged gentleman, often socially conser-
vative, who was content to let the rabble have their superstition if it helped
them behave. In the 1820s and 1830s, by contrast, religious skepticism was
being fused to radical social reform movements, and it threatened to
become prominent among the urban working class.”208 Reverend Lyman
Beecher declared in 1830 that religious skepticism “is now the epidemic
of the world, as superstition was in the dark ages.”209
Skeptics were particularly doubtful of eschatology and beliefs in the
afterlife. Views about life after death were especially susceptible to
doubt, they thought, because those beliefs were not founded on reason.210
Like the development of Universalism decades earlier, increasing religious
skepticism and disbelief put considerable strain on existing competency
rules.
A. Public Debate and Legal Reform
The new wave of reform efforts in the 1830s relied on familiar arguments,
such as constitutional principles of religious liberty. Accordingly, reform-
ers initially sought to prohibit the introduction of any evidence of religious
belief, even to attack an atheist witness’s credibility. But whereas
Universalists were organized, numerous, and often (at least by the
1820s) respected as fellow Christians within their communities, atheists
lacked public sympathy.211 “The Atheist is not only a fool, but a madman,”
207. Christopher Grasso, “Skepticism and American Faith: Infidels, Converts, and
Religious Doubt in the Early Nineteenth Century,” Journal of the Early Republic 22
(2002): 480; and Bratt, “The Reorientation of American Protestantism,” 52–53. See also
Grasso, “The Boundaries of Toleration and Tolerance,” 286–302.
208. Grasso, “Skepticism and American Faith,” 480.
209. Ibid., 486 (quoting Lyman Beecher, Lectures on Scepticism, Delivered in Park Street
Church, Boston, and in the Second Presbyterian Church, Cincinnati [Cincinnati: Corey &
Fairbank, 1835], 86).
210. Ibid., 508. Universalists vigorously opposed this view, arguing that their belief in
universal salvation was based on rational premises.
211. By the mid-1830s, there were likely hundreds of thousands of Universalists in the
United States, albeit still heavily concentrated in New England and New York. See John
Hayward, The Religious Creeds and Statistics of Every Christian Denomination in the
United States and British Provinces (Boston: Jonathan Howe, 1836), 151. In a scholarly
assessment, Russell Miller describes the contemporary Universalist population statistics as
likely exaggerated, but Universalism was nonetheless steadily growing and was already
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one New York legislator declared. “Would you permit such a creature as
this to testify?”212 Reformers therefore subtly changed their strategy.
As efforts to allow atheist testimony faltered, they increasingly argued
that juries were capable of evaluating the credibility of testimony in light
of a witness’s religious views, subtly shifting the debate to one about juries
rather than about atheists.
Following their earlier successes, reformers continued to emphasize reli-
gious freedom. Millard Fillmore, then a young lawyer and staunch
Anti-Masonic legislator from Buffalo, argued that excluding atheists was
“inconsistent with the constitution of the State; and is at war with some
of the most valued and most sacred principles, embodied in that charter
of our liberties and civil rights.”213 John Bolles, a Democratic lawyer
from Boston, noted that “[t]he law affixes a penalty,—and a very severe
and odious penalty,—upon certain opinions in regard to religious matters,
and it must, therefore, by the advocates of toleration and religious liberty,
be regarded with abhorrence.”214 Religion-based exclusions, Bolles
argued, were “a violation of the freedom of conscience.”215 Reformers’
views of free exercise, these arguments illustrate, were becoming even
more disjoined from natural-rights principles; atheists, after all, had no
“religion” to practice.
perhaps the sixth most populous American religious sect by the mid-1830s. Russell
E. Miller, The Larger Hope: The First Century of the Universalist Church in America,
1770–1870 (Boston: Unitarian Universalist Association, 1979), 161–62.
212. “Sketch of the Remarks of Mr. C. Rogers of Washington County, in Committee of
the Whole, on the Bill Introduced by Mr. Herttell, in Relation to the Rights and Competency
of Witnesses,” Albany Evening Journal, March 30, 1837, 2. See also “Report Relating to
Incompetency of Witnesses on Account of Religious Belief,” 19 (“In its moral influence,
nothing can be more pernicious than atheism. It is the bane and pest of society, the grave
of every virtuous sentiment”). But see “An Atheist,” Boston Recorder, July 3, 1835, 107
(“It was given in evidence for the government, that [Enoch] Winkley,” an atheist barred
from testifying, “was a man of respectability, wealth and influence, and that he was often
entrusted with important town offices in Amesbury”).
213. Millard Fillmore, “An Examination of the Question, ‘Is it Right to Require Any
Religious Test as a Qualification to be a Witness in a Court of Justice?’” Publications of
the Buffalo Historical Society 10 (Buffalo: Buffalo Historical Society, 1907): 77. Fillmore
published the pamphlet under the pseudonym “Juridicus” in 1832.
214. Bolles, “Qualifications of Witnesses,” 488.
215. Ibid. See also Edward Livingston, “Introductory Report to the Code of Evidence,” in
A System of Penal Law for the State of Louisiana (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Co.,
1833), 286 (“[T]he right of appearing as a witness against one who has committed a
crime affecting the party, is a civil and temporal right; to deprive him of it, for want of uni-
formity of faith in any one point with the rest of the community, is to deprive him of it for a
difference in religious belief, which is contrary to the constitution and laws”). Debates in
Connecticut in 1830 reflected similar views.
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Reformers also launched a frontal attack on the epistemological under-
pinnings of religion-based competency rules. According to New York law-
yer Elisha P. Hurlbut, “the notion that religious faith is necessary in order
to ensure a proper regard for truth . . . is unphilosophical and opposed to the
experience of practical men. The religious sentiments are independent of
that faculty of the mind which respects the truth.”216 Moreover, atheists
had similar incentives to tell the truth. “The dread of shame and infamy
that necessarily attaches to the man who gives false testimony,” Fillmore
wrote, “has the same influence upon the atheist as the believer.” Positive
inducements to truth telling such as respect for justice and morality, he
insisted, “all operate with the same force upon the atheist as upon any
other individual.”217 Other commentators went even further, noting that
atheists and skeptics may actually prove themselves more trustworthy by
openly declaring their dissenting views.218
Reformers also highlighted the ineffectiveness of oaths to generate truth
telling in court. “The fear of future punishment, has probably less weight
than is generally imagined,” wrote John Appleton. “Those who would dis-
regard the present motives to truth, would regard little a future punishment,
which by its very remoteness, loses its effect.”219 Bolles agreed: “[T]he
mass of witnesses . . . care vastly more for what is present, tangible, real,
than for all that is spiritual, invisible and remote. To refine with such per-
sons upon the duties growing out of an oath, is to cast pearls before the
swine.”220 “All must concede,” argued Fillmore in a similar vein, “that
the fear of future punishment with the great majority of witnesses, is not
half as powerful to prevent perjury, as the fear of punishment inflicted
216. Elisha P. Hurlbut, Essays on Human Rights and their Political Guaranties
(New York: Greeley & McElrath, 1845), 79–80. See also John Appleton, “Of
Incompetency of Witnesses on Account of Religious Opinion,” American Jurist & Law
Magazine (1830), 4:288; and Bolles, “Qualifications of Witnesses,” 498.
217. Fillmore, “An Examination of the Question,” 75. See also Timothy Walker,
Introduction to American Law, Designed as a First Book for Students (Philadelphia: P.H.
Nicklin & T. Johnson, 1837), 544.
218. See, for example, Livingston, “Introductory Report to the Code of Evidence,” 285
(avowed atheism “requires some courage” and “must add to his credit”); “Catechising
Witnesses,” Gospel Anchor (Troy, NY), March 16, 1833, 301 (“Under the present prejudices
entertained by the public, a man who declares himself an Atheist, must be a fearless and
honest truth teller”); and Bolles, “Qualifications of Witnesses,” 490 (noting that skeptics
may be “frank and honest” for declaring their views). Compare “An Atheist,” Boston
Recorder, July 3, 1835, 107 (“For our part, we should place much more confidence in the
testimony of a witness, who should honestly avow himself an atheist, and on that ground
refuse to swear, than of one who should swear by a being, whose existence he disbelieves”).
219. Appleton, “Of Incompetency,” 289–90.
220. Bolles, “Qualifications of Witnesses,” 486.
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by human laws.”221 Although made by reformers, these comments illus-
trate a declining sense that oaths actually triggered a fear of divine punish-
ment. Many people continued to believe in hell, but the primacy of eternal
damnation in American religious thought had been eroding for years.222
In response, arguments in favor of the restrictive common-law rule
became increasingly tautological. Rather than defending the effectiveness
of oaths, proponents of testimonial exclusion simply assumed that oaths
were necessary and then exposed the incongruity of an atheist invoking
divine punishment.223 In response, one reformer observed that the absur-
dity of administering a divine sanction to an atheist was a product of the
legal meaning of an oath rather than its practical import. “Were the witness
to testify under the pains and penalties of perjury,” the reformer succinctly
explained, “the absurdity above supposed, would at once vanish.”224
Others suggested that, although administering an oath to atheists would
be a “mere mockery,” atheists should nonetheless be able to give testimony
under penalty of perjury, “the jury being left, of course, to judge how much
it is worth.”225
221. Fillmore, “An Examination of the Question,” 76. See also “Religious Test for
Oaths,” Universalist Watchman, Repository and Chronicle (Montpelier, VT), November
15, 1845, 5 (“[The oath] does not seem to inspire the witness with any degree of sacredness,
reverence or awe—with any sense of God or fear of divine retribution”); Titus, “Exclusion of
Witnesses for Unbelief,” Law Reporter (August 1839), 2:98–99 (“There is not one case in a
hundred where the individual taking the oath considers himself as invoking the vengeance of
the Deity upon him if he speaks falsely”); and “On Judicial Oaths,” American Jurist and
Law Magazine 19 (1838): 78 (“Many men . . . take the oath, without understanding the pecu-
liar obligations which they assume, or the force of the imprecations which they invoke upon
themselves”).
222. See note 101.
223. An 1843 article in the Methodist Quarterly Review is illustrative. While acknowledg-
ing that atheists could be trustworthy, the writer emphatically denied that this fact bore on
their capacity to testify. “The truth principle upon which the law rests,” the author argued,
“is simply this: that belief in the existence of a supreme Being, who will punish false swear-
ing, is necessary to a feeling of the moral obligation of an oath.” “Review of Thomas
Herttell, Rights of Conscience Defended” [1835], Methodist Quarterly Review 25
(1843): 15.
224. Appleton, “Of Incompetency,” 290.
225. “An Atheist,” Boston Recorder, July 3, 1835, 107. This argument was common. See,
for example, D. Pickering, “Reply to Mr. Cowell’s ‘Card,’” Providence Patriot, December 1,
1827, 2 (“An Atheist cannot swear by the Deity, because he does not believe in his exis-
tence; yet he may affirm, and his evidence appreciated according to his weight of character
for truth and veracity”); “Testimony of Universalists,” Western Recorder (Utica, NY), July
6, 1830, 1 (asserting that “administering of oaths” to atheists and Universalists is “mere
mockery,” but arguing that “every man, who passes among his neighbours as a man of
truth,” should be allowed to “tell his story, and let the jury value it at what [it] is
worth”); Bolles, “Qualifications of Witnesses,” 484 (“Now if an affirmation is as efficacious
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Reform efforts did not meet with immediate success, but over the course
of the 1830s and 1840s several states adopted competency rules that
allowed atheists to testify. Reformers’ rhetorical and legislative strategies,
however, shifted over this period. Initially, they sought to preclude all evi-
dence of religious belief. But in the second phase of legislative reform,
reformers pursued more modest goals, seeking to liberalize competency
rules while allowing juries to weigh the credibility of testimony based
on a witness’s religious views.226
As described earlier, efforts to exclude all evidence of religious belief
were common in the 1820s and early 1830s. Erastus Root led the unsuc-
cessful charge in the 1821 New York ratifying convention, arguing against
using religious views to attack a witness’s credibility.227 At the end of that
decade, similar legislative proposals were offered—and defeated—
in Connecticut and New York.228 Reform efforts came closer to fruition
in the 1830s, gaining the approval of a special legislative committee in
Vermont and the House of Representatives in Massachusetts.229
According to the Vermont committee, the state constitution barred efforts
“to pry into the religious sentiments of citizens, and to deprive them of
as an oath, in any case, why not adopt it universally?”); Public Ledger (Philadelphia),
February 2, 1837, 2 (“The best rule would be to put no questions about religious belief,
but to dispense with oaths where witnesses require it, to hold them under the penalties of
perjury, and to increase the severity of these penalties”); and “Religious Test for Oaths,”
Universalist Watchman, Repository and Chronicle (Montpelier, VT), November 15, 1845,
5 (“To us, it appears worse that useless, for an atheist . . . to swear by a God whose very
existence he disbelieves. . . . We would have every individual allowed to testify in our courts
under the pains and penalties of perjury, . . . and let the jury judge of the probability of his
story and take into consider his general character as a religious and moral man”).
226. In most states, credibility evidence regarding religious beliefs was still proved by
other witnesses, not the witness whose religious beliefs were at issue. But see Stanbro
v. Hopkins, 28 Barb. 265, 269 (N.Y. 1858).
227. See note 132.
228. In 1829, reformers in the Connecticut House of Representatives proposed a measure
stating that “no person’s religious belief shall affect his admissibility to an oath, or his cred-
ibility as a witness.” See note 176. The final bill allowed credibility assessments. See note
185. Reformers in New York proposed a sweeping bill that would have precluded any tes-
timony—including credibility evidence—respecting a witness’s religious beliefs or lack
thereof. “An Act Relative to the Competency of Witnesses,” in Fillmore, “An
Examination of the Question,” 71. The primary sponsor of this bill apparently continued
to introduce it annually without success. “Sketch of the Remarks of Mr. C. Rogers of
Washington County, in Committee of the Whole, on the Bill Introduced by Mr. Herttell
in Relation to the Rights and Competency of Witnesses,” Albany Evening Journal, March
30, 1837, 2.
229. Journal of the General Assembly of the State of Vermont, 209; Age (Augusta, ME),
February 8, 1837, 3. See also Formisano and Pickering, “The Christian Nation Debate and
Witness Competency,” 243.
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their right to testify, on account of their supposed heresies.”230 In both
states, however, the full legislatures declined to take action. A senate com-
mittee report in Massachusetts chastised the lower chamber’s flirtations
with allowing atheist testimony.231 With the exception of a single legisla-
tive victory in Maine, reformers were unable to pass measures that barred
credibility challenges based on religious beliefs, and even Maine allowed
atheism-based challenges.232
Reform efforts in the 1820s and early 1830s thus demonstrate a consis-
tent desire to preclude competency and credibility challenges based on reli-
gious views. When these proposals were defeated, however, reformers
narrowed their attacks, arguing that atheists should be allowed to testify,
but that evidence of religious belief could be admitted to impeach their
credibility. One of the principal arguments used in this new strategy was
that jurors were capable lie detectors and could adequately weigh the effect
of a witness’s religious views. Courts had occasionally made this argument
in the 1820s when they allowed credibility evidence against Universalist
witnesses.233 Nevertheless, references to juries were largely absent during
the earlier legislative debates.
When efforts to exclude all evidence of belief faltered, reformers became
effusive in praise of juries and their ability to uncover the truth. According
to John Bolles:
230. Journal of the General Assembly of the State of Vermont, 207. On November 4,
1845, the Vermont House passed a bill modeled after the Rhode Island statute abolishing
competency rules based on religious belief. See The Journal of the House of
Representatives of the State of Vermont, October Session, 1845 (Windsor: Bishop &
Tracy, 1846), 209–10. The bill failed in the Senate the following day. See The Journal of
the Senate of the State of Vermont, October Session, 1845 (Windsor: Bishop & Tracy,
1846), 131.
231. “Report Relating to Incompetency of Witnesses on Account of Religious Belief,”
8. Three years earlier, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court eliminated inquiries regard-
ing particular theistic beliefs, remarking that “the religious faith of witnesses is not a subject
for argument or proof.” Otherwise, the court stated, “if the witness belongs to a sect which
holds that the duration or extent of future punishment will be less than it will be according to
the tenets of a different sect, you might argue that his testimony is not entitled to so much
confidence as it would be if he belonged to the latter sect.” Commonwealth v. Buzzell, 33
Mass. (16 Pick.) 153, 156 (1834), also reported in Trial of John R. Buzzell Before the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Boston: Russell, Odiorne, & Metcalf, 1834), 55.
232. This law, passed in 1833, provided: “No person who believes in the existence of a
supreme being, shall be adjudged an incompetent or incredible witness in any judicial court,
or in the course of judicial proceedings, on account of his opinions in matters of religion; nor
shall such opinions be made a subject of investigation or inquiry.” The Revised Statutes of
the State of Maine, 2nd ed. (Hallowell: Glazier, Masters & Smith, 1847), 505.
233. Compare note 111.
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Very few instances can occur, in which a witness is desirous of testifying
falsely, without any discovery to the jury of that disposition. The very manner
of the man becomes a language, more eloquent than words. . . . Rarely, very
rarely, does it happen, that an important witness can lean to the one hand or
the other, unobserved; and still more rarely can such a witness perjure him-
self, without detection by the cross-examining counsel. . . . That the proposed
change [to allow atheists] would more fully meet the ends of justice in all
cases, is clear; for jurors could vary the rule, according to the circumstances
of the case, awarding to each witness, and each fact, its due value and
importance.234
“Whatever may be urged against any witness, as affecting character,”
another jurist stated, “should be urged against his credit and not his com-
petency. . . . In every case of conflicting testimony, it is a question of com-
parison, weighing the different characters and motives of witnesses, as to
their effect on testimony, and after this comparison, believing or disbeliev-
ing their statements.”235 A Wisconsin newspaper took the point a step fur-
ther, arguing that “[t]he jury are the ones who, by right, should determine
from [the witness’s] mouth, or from his character proved by other wit-
nesses, whether he is entitled to credit or not.”236
By framing the issue in terms of juries and witness credibility, reformers
advocated change without impugning the logic of the common-law compe-
tency rules. Prospective witnesses who did not believe in God or hell
would receive only whatever credit their testimony was due—no more
and no less—leaving juries free to discount or disregard atheist testimony.
As Universalist minister Abel Thomas argued: “Hundreds of profane
swearers, drunkards, gamblers, and other vile persons are annually permit-
ted to testify in our courts . . . and though respectable citizens may be sum-
moned to testify that they would not accredit such persons under oath, this
234. Bolles, “Qualifications of Witnesses,” 496–97.
235. Appleton, “Of Incompetency,” 288–89. See also, for example, Walker, Introduction
to American Law, 544 (“[T]he want of religious belief ought not to render a witness incom-
petent, though the jury may properly take it into consideration in weighing his credibility”);
Titus, “Exclusion of Witnesses for Unbelief,” 2:98 (“[T]he witness can be cross-examined
by the opposite party, and the accuracy of his knowledge, and his disposition to tell the
truth fully tested—because the jury can observe his appearance upon the stand, and his man-
ner of testifying, and thus judge of the truth of what he is saying, and because he testifies
under the pains and penalties of perjury”). But see Public Ledger (Philadelphia), February
14, 1837, 2 (arguing that oaths and all inquiries into religious belief should be abolished
and replaced with more stringent perjury laws).
236. “Oaths in Court,” Oshkosh Democrat (WI), August 22, 1851, 2 (emphasis added);
see also “Rejection of a Witness,” Spectator (New York, NY), June 5, 1847, 1 (“The jury
might disregard his evidence, for the reason that they doubt his sincerity [regarding his
changed religious faith], but we conceive that question to be one exclusively for the decision
of the jury”).
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does not affect their competency, but merely their credibility.”237 Jurors
were, after all, capable of deciding what was true. Using this argument,
reformists transformed the debate into one about juror capacity rather
than about the sense of solemn obligation among atheists. In light of the
relative popularity of juries and atheists, this strategy made good political
sense.
Debates at the 1846 constitutional convention in New York illustrate the
effectiveness of this strategy. One of the Whig delegates, Moses Taggart,
moved for a constitutional provision that “no man shall be deprived of
any right or rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his opin-
ions or religious belief.”238 According to Taggart, “[i]f there was anything
in [a witness’s religious beliefs] thus affecting his credibility let it go to the
jury. Let it go to his credit and not to his competency.”239 The discussion
that followed showed the usual diversity of views on atheists’ competency
to testify. One delegate analogized the practice of excluding atheists to the
Southern practice of excluding blacks from testifying.240 Another seemed
to agree that competency was best left to the jury but opposed the proposal
because “[b]y putting the question, we imply a doubt of the existence of the
Deity.”241 When the convention voted on Taggart’s motion, the measure
passed comfortably by a vote of 63 to 46.242
237. Abel C. Thomas, Strictures on Religious Tests, with Special Reference to the Late
Reform Convention (Philadelphia: J. Richards, 1838), 10. Thomas was a Universalist min-
ister in Philadelphia, Lowell, Brooklyn, and Cincinnati. James Grant Wilson and John
Fiske, eds., Appleton’s Cyclopædia of American Biography, 6 vols. (New York:
D. Appleton & Co., 1888–89), 6:77.
238. Debates and Proceedings in the New-York State Convention for the Revision of the
Constitution (Albany, NY: Albany Argus, 1846), 807–8. Earlier in the convention, Taggart
had proposed similar language that “no person shall be deprived of any right or provision, or
rendered incompetent as a witness, on account of his religious belief or unbelief.” Taggart
explained “that his main object was to abolish the law which declared persons holding cer-
tain opinions from being a witness.—He desired to see such objections apply to the credi-
bility, not the competency of the witness.” Ibid., 430 (remarks of Mr. Taggart).
239. Ibid., 809 (remarks of Mr. Taggart). The delegates voted down by a vote of 92 to 12
an amendment that “evidence may be given as to the belief or disbelief of the witness in the
obligation of an oath, and of the ground of such belief or disbelief, in order to enable the jury
to judge of his credibility.” Ibid. The language of Taggart’s motion, however, specifically
went only toward the witness’s competency, and immediately before the vote, Taggart
had clarified that evidence could still be offered to impeach a witness’s credibility. Ibid.
240. Ibid., 808 (remarks of Mr. Loomis) (stating that atheist incompetency “was anala-
gous [sic] to a custom in certain parts of this country, where testimony was excluded because
the witness was a man of color or a slave, however true it might be”).
241. Ibid. (remarks of Mr. Stow).
242. Ibid., 809.
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After New York’s Constitutional Convention voted to allow atheist testi-
mony, the rule quickly spread west. With New York’s Constitution often
used as a model, similar provisions appeared in the constitutions of
Wisconsin (1848),243 California (1849),244 Indiana (1851),245 Ohio (1851),246
Iowa (1857),247 Minnesota (1857),248 Oregon (1857),249 and Kansas
(1859).250 Other states, along with the District of Columbia, passed legis-
lation allowing both atheist testimony and credibility evidence respecting
religious views.251
Although religion-based competency rules were changing in the 1830s
and 1840s, reform in some states lagged behind. At Pennsylvania’s 1838
Constitutional Convention, delegates voted down a proposal to allow
Universalist testimony.252 Debates at the convention, however, were mud-
dled. Some delegates remarked that the common law was already under-
stood to admit Universalists as witnesses.253 (Indeed, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held Universalist testimony to be admissible just 3 years
243. Wisconsin Constitution of 1848, art. 1, § 19.
244. California Constitution of 1849, art. 1, § 4.
245. Indiana Constitution of 1851, art. 1, § 7.
246. Ohio Constitution of 1851, art. 1, § 7.
247. Iowa Constitution of 1857, art. 1, § 4.
248. Minnesota Constitution of 1857, art. 1, § 17.
249. Oregon Constitution of 1857, art. 1, § 6.
250. Kansas Constitution of 1859, Bill of Rights, § 7. See also Michigan Constitution of
1835, art. XII, § 1 (“no other oath, declaration, or test shall be required as a qualification for
any office or public trust”). At the convention, the delegates briefly debated a motion to
include a provision specifically addressing witness incompetency, but delegates rejected
the motion after someone noted that “the subject was already provided for in the bill of
rights.” Harold M. Dorr, ed., The Michigan Constitutional Conventions of 1835–36:
Debates and Proceedings (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1940) (remarks of
Mr. McClelland).
251. Title IV, ch. 115, §§ 5–6, in Revised Code of the District of Columbia (Washington:
A. O. P. Nicholson, 1857), 439. See, for example, “An Act Concerning Witnesses,” § 18, in
Revised Statutes of the State of Missouri (St. Louis: Argus, 1835), 623. But see “An Act
Relating to the Rights and Competency of Witnesses,” § 1, in The Acts and Resolves of
the State of Vermont, at the October Session, 1851 (Montpelier: E. P. Walton & Son,
1851), 9 (“No person shall be deemed to be incompetent . . . on account of his opinions
on matters of religious belief; nor shall any witness be questioned, nor any testimony be
taken or received, in relation thereto”).
252. John Agg, ed., Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania to Propose Amendments to the Constitution, 14 vols. (Harrisburg: Packer,
Barrett, & Parke, 1838), 11:227–49.
253. Ibid., 240 (remarks of Mr. Porter) (citing Judge Cowan’s Reports, which presumably
meant Butts v. Swartwood and People v. Matteson), and ibid., 248 (remarks of Mr. Dickey)
(stating that he did not think excluding witnesses based on disbelief in rewards and punish-
ments was the rule of evidence).
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later.)254 Others thought that broader protections should be pursued in the
legislature rather than cluttering the constitution with minutiae.255 In 1851,
a similar constitutional proposal barely passed at a convention in
Maryland.256 The closeness of the vote seems odd given that
Universalists (and even atheists) were allowed to testify in other states.
Nevertheless, the lack of prior controversy may have left reformers unpre-
pared to frame the debate in the most favorable light.257 In neither state did
they emphasize the role of juries in evaluating witness credibility.258
B. Atheists in Court
In states without laws to permit atheist testimony, some parties nonetheless
asserted in court that atheists should be allowed to testify. These legal
claims, however, were far more problematic than arguments in favor of
admitting Universalist witnesses. No ambiguities in the common law left
the door cracked for atheist testimony. And constitutionally protected reli-
gious liberty usually extended only to people with theistic beliefs.
In 1836, for example, Judge Peter Thacher of the Boston municipal
court—who had admitted Universalist testimony in 1829 partly on
religious-freedom grounds259—firmly denounced the idea that atheists
deserved the same treatment: “That this fair world is without an intelligent
creator . . . [is] absurd and absolutely incomprehensible. . . . While men
yield to such delusions, the law refuses to them some of its privileges;
and admonishes them, in that mild way, to correct their dangerous errors,
254. Cubbison v. M‘Creary, 2 Watts & Serg. 262 (Pa. 1841).
255. Agg, Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 11:239.
256. The Maryland convention voted on several measures, finally adopting a provision, by
a vote of 42 to 27, stating that a witness or juror would not be disqualified so long as he
believed “in the existence of a God, and that under his dispensation such person will be
held morally accountable for his acts, and will be rewarded or punished therefor, either in
this world or in the world to come.” Debates and Proceedings of the Maryland Reform
Convention to Revise the State Constitution, 2 vols. (Annapolis: William M‘Neir, 1851),
1:214, 216.
257. Changes in views of divine punishment and damnation may also have lagged in
Maryland, where the Roman Catholic Church was especially strong.
258. A reformer in Pennsylvania made one attempt to frame the issue in terms of juror
competence. See Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 11:245 (remarks of A.H. Read) (noting that “jurors have sense and intelli-
gence enough to discriminate”).
259. Commonwealth v. Batchelder, Thacher Cr. 191, 196 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1829) (“To
withhold equal civil privileges from any of our citizens, however they may differ in their
speculative views of religious faith, seems to me to be against the spirit of our institutions”).
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before she will confide in their integrity or intelligence, to dispose of the
rights of others in a court of justice.”260
Twelve years later, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court followed
suit, holding that the constitutional provision that “no subject shall be hurt,
molested, or restrained in his person, or estate . . . for his religious profes-
sions or sentiments” was inapplicable to atheists because “disbelief in the
existence of any God, is not a religious, but an anti-religious,
sentiment.”261
In some states, however, judges loosened competency rules by gener-
ously stretching the meaning of the common law. In 1833, for example,
the Supreme Court of Ohio allowed a witness to testify who “said he
saw God in trees, bushes, herbage, and everything he saw” and that “he
did anything wrong he was condemned in his conscience.”262 The court
260. Commonwealth v. Wyman & Robinson, Thacher Cr. 432, 437 (Boston Mun. Ct.
1836).
261. Thurston v. Whitney, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 104, 110 (1848). The court also stated that
even if atheists had a right to religious freedom, “the rejection of a witness for such a dis-
belief or sentiment, as incompetent, would be no violation of this article of the constitution.
It is not within its words or meaning. It would not hurt, molest, or restrain him, in his person,
liberty, or estate.” Ibid. See also Scott v. Hooper, 14 Vt. 535, 539 (1842) (“It would, indeed,
be worse than solemn mockery to be engaged in administering an oath to him who can feel
no religious obligation”); Commonwealth v. Moody (Mass. Ct. Com. Pl. 1835) (holding that
a materialist who “does not believe in a Supreme, Intelligent Ruler of the Universe” was not
competent to testify), reported in “Interesting Decision,” Salem Gazette, June 23, 1835, 2;
“An Atheist,” Boston Recorder, July 3, 1835, 107 (reporting the decision of Judge Strong
that a government witness named Enoch Winkley was incompetent to testify, notwithstand-
ing his asserted belief in God, because he was “a materialist; one of a sect that has grown up
within a few years, and who do not believe in a Supreme intelligent Being, who governs all
events”); “Incompetency of an Infidel Witness,” in Hazard’s United States Commercial and
Statistical Register, ed. Samuel Hazard (Philadelphia: Wm. F. Geddes, 1840), 1:87 (“Judge
[Ross] Wilkins, in the United States Court at Detroit, has decided that the testimony of an
atheist is not admissible”); and Commonwealth v. Gates (Boston Police Ct. 1839)
(Rogers, J.), reported in “Religious Belief of Witnesses,” Washington National
Intelligencer, July 2, 1839, 2 (if “a witness believes in the existence of no other God, except
Nature or the Material World, he does not . . . believe in the existence of a God”).
262. Easterday v. Kilborn, 1 Wright 346 (Ohio 1833). Justice John Wright argued that the
common-law rule was invalid based on the Ohio constitutional provision that “no human
authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.”
Ibid., 346–47. This was a striking shift from the same court’s ruling just years earlier in
Newbury v. Lingo (1827), which had unanimously reversed a lower court’s decision to
allow a witness who did not “believe in the existence of a God, or a future state of rewards
and punishments.” One of the judges “stated that all nations had some form of an oath, in
order to impose a religious obligation upon the conscience—but no such obligation could
be imposed upon the conscience of a person who disbelieved it.” The panel declined a
motion to refer the matter to the full court, explaining that “in this case the court could
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ruled that the witness’s testimony was admissible because he saw God “in
all created nature.”263 As a committee of the Ohio House of
Representatives gingerly described a few years later, “The test here
accepted by the court was certainly not a very rigid one.”264
Other judges made it harder to prove that witnesses had disqualifying
beliefs. In 1841, for example, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court—
although openly skeptical of the common-law rule265—emphasized that
“courts ought to require clear, open, deliberate, avowals of the disbelief
on the part of the proposed witness.”266 In his diary, New York lawyer
Henry Vanderlyn expressed frustration when judges employed this strict
approach:
The first witness called was Newell Evans. . . . We objected to his
Competency because He was an Atheist, & proved that He had been an
Atheist for the past 10 or 12 years by 5 Witnesses. To disprove this, He
offered 3 witnesses who had heard him say since the filling of this indict
[men]t that He believed in God. It appeared from these 3 witnesses that
Evans had been cautioned to express himself in favor of a God to avoid
the effect on his evidence of his disbelief. Notwithstanding the undoubted
proof of his Atheism, the Court composed of Judge Monell, York, &
Lamb – 3 locos Focos (Politics have entered largely into the prosecution,
Evans being loco & Owen a conspicuous Whig of Bainbridge) decided He
was admissible – a shameful decision.267
not for a moment entertain a doubt” about its decision. “Law of Ohio,” Niles’ Weekly
Register (Baltimore), November 8, 1828, 166.
263. Easterday v. Kilborn, 1 Wright 347. See also Halley v. Webster, 21 Me. 461, 461–62
(1842) (rejecting an effort to discredit a witness based on his prior statement that he “had lost
his devotion; that he intended now to serve the devil as long as he had served the Lord; that
he had a pack of cards with him which he carried about in his pocket, and called them his
bible”).
264. Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Ohio, Being the First Session
of the Thirty-Sixth General Assembly (Columbus: Samuel Medary, 1837–38), 106. The com-
mittee declined to recommend any further liberalization of the common-law rule, explaining
that “[i]t must be very rare indeed that injustice would result from the inforcement of a rule
so relaxed as in its judicial interpretation, as that now under review.” Ibid.
265. Smith v. Coffin, 18 Me. 157, 163 (1841). Concurring, Justice Nicholas Emery was
contemptuous of the law proscribing atheist testimony: “I can frankly declare, that a
much more appropriate title to the [witness competency] act would be, ‘An act to deprive
witnesses of freedom of opinion in matters of religion, and to jeopardize the rights of inno-
cent people.’” Ibid., 165 (emphasis omitted).
266. Ibid., 164.
267. Entry of April 14, 1840, Henry Vanderlyn Diary, 7 vols. (April 1827–March 1857),
New York Historical Society, 4:278–79. I thank Amalia Kessler for pointing me to this
source.
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Vanderlyn attributed the judges’ decision to politics—and of course he
may have been correct—but similar episodes were fairly common.268
In 1846, the General Court of Virginia issued the first reported opinion
holding that any exclusions based on religious belief were unconstitutional
infringements of religious liberty. In Perry v. Commonwealth,269 a murder
suspect had objected to one of the prosecution witnesses based on defect of
religious principle.270 On appeal, Judge John Scott wrote that the common-
law doctrine had been framed “according to the spirit of the age in which
the rule was introduced. England was a Christian country.”271 Scott
continued:
The progress of science and civilization, and the demands of commerce, have
led to a relaxation of the rule [preventing non-Christians from testifying]; but
it still retains a portion of its intolerant spirit; and the Courts of Justice in
England, and in some of our sister States, have exercised an inquisitorial
power over the religious belief of witnesses. In some of the States it has
been relaxed or annulled by statutory and constitutional provisions. In
Virginia, it was wholly abrogated by our Bill of Rights, and the act for secur-
ity religious freedom, subsequently engrafted in the amended Constitution.272
The state’s 1830 constitution, Scott declared, put “all religions on a footing
of perfect equality; protecting all; imposing neither burdens nor civil inca-
pacities upon any.”273 Barring the testimony of certain individuals because
of their religious views, by contrast, stigmatized those persons as being
268. The most famous example, stemming from the William Morgan affair, was Judge
Samuel Nelson’s decision to allow Edward Giddins—whom another trial judge had
excluded as a witness in 1828—to testify in related trials in 1831. Nelson explained that evi-
dence of Giddin’s beliefs was “contradictory” and “apparently irreconcilable,” and that
“[t]he witness was presumed in the first instance, to be competent, and . . . he should always
hold the party objecting, to make out a clear and undoubted case of disqualification, before
he would exclude.” Nelson noted that “the objection was in its nature penal as to the wit-
ness.” Reported in Trial of Parkhurst Whitney, 24.
269. Perry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 645 (1846).
270. The witness seems to have been a Universalist, see ibid., 647, but the implication of
the decision seems clear: Defect of religious principle was no longer grounds for incompe-
tency in Virginia. See ibid., 655 (stating that the constitution proclaimed “to all our citizens
that henceforth their religious thoughts and conversations shall be as free as the air they
breathe”). See also I. T., “Religious Belief as Qualification of Witness,” in The Lawyers
Reports Annotated, Book XLII, ed. Burdett A. Rich (Rochester, NY: The Lawyers’
Co-Operative Publishing Co., 1905), 568 (“The dicta of the case show that no religious opin-
ion is there required”).
271. Perry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. 652.
272. Ibid., 654.
273. Ibid., 654–55. An isolated statement at Virginia’s Constitutional Convention reveals
one delegate’s view that oath taking required belief in God and a future state of rewards and
punishments, and that this rule was “not contradicted by” the declaration of religious
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“unworthy of belief” and placed their security and their property at risk
because they might become victims of crime without legal recourse.274
The declared incompetency of an entire group, in other words, might put
that group beyond the protection of law.275
IV. Conclusion
By the mid-nineteenth century, Americans had abandoned the religious
exclusivity of swearing. Universalists and others who disavowed hell
were allowed to testify in courts across the United States, and in most states
juries were left to determine how witnesses’ religious views should affect
their credibility. By 1860, even atheists were allowed to testify in at least
fifteen of the thirty-four states, plus in the District of Columbia.276 Belief in
atheist incompetency lingered well into the twentieth century in some
areas,277 but the religious premises of oath taking had already substantially
eroded.278
Theological changes fueled these developments. For one, oaths provided
weaker assurance of truthfulness once eternal damnation became less cen-
tral in religious life. The advent of Universalism and growth of atheism
also confronted courts and legislatures with a choice between relaxing
oath requirements and excluding witnesses based on their religious views.
Given these religious developments, legal change became necessary.
Excluding a witness here or there did not pose a serious threat to the
freedom. See Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829–30
(Richmond: Samuel Shepherd & Co. 1830), 457 (remarks of William H. Brodnax).
274. Perry, 44 Va. 657, 658.
275. Ten years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court similarly lambasted the idea that
“to be sworn as a witness is no privilege—the person loses nothing by being incompetent.”
Such a view, the Court ruled, was “wholly repugnant to the tolerant and enlightened spirit of
our institutions and of the age in which we live.” Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 25, 30–
31 (1856).
276. Those states that allowed atheist testimony were: California, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Kansas, which had written its constitution in 1859, was in the pro-
cess of becoming a state. An 1877 decision in Ohio, however, called into question the pre-
vailing rule in that state. See I. T., “Religious Belief as Qualification of Witness,” 563.
277. For a helpful discussion of these laws, see Paul W. Kaufman, “Disbelieving
Nonbelievers: Atheism, Competence, and Credibility in the Turn of the Century
American Courtroom,” Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 15 (2003): 395–433; and
Frank Swancara, “Non-Religious Witnesses,” Wisconsin Law Review 8 (1932): 49–66.
For a thorough review of pertinent nineteenth-century cases, statutes, and constitutional pro-
visions, see I. T., “Religious Belief as Qualification of Witness,” 553–68.
278. See note 101.
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rule of law, but strict enforcement of competency rules would have proved
crippling once large segments of the population began disavowing God
and hell. Indeed, President Washington sought to drive home a similar
point in his Farewell Address, insisting that widespread religious belief
was needed to ensure the proper functioning of the legal system. When
those beliefs were no longer present, with religious dissent and disbelief
coming forcefully into the open, the existing system clearly had to change.
How or when this reform would occur, however, was hardly obvious or
inevitable. Social and legal pressures were building, but it remained up to
individuals to harness those pressures. And the way that this story unfolded
offers useful insights into early nineteenth-century legal culture. When
pushing for a more liberal evidence regime, reformers deployed a range
of new arguments. In particular, they simultaneously promoted and drew
upon novel understandings of religious freedom, civil rights, and jury
capacity—shifts that each had enduring significance for American legal
history.
At the outset of the nineteenth century, judges were generally uncon-
cerned with guaranteeing government neutrality toward religious beliefs:
the core principle of modern free-exercise jurisprudence.279 Instead, deci-
sions emphasized that the natural right of conscience protected the auton-
omy to practice religion without governmental interference. That rule
barred intrusive courtroom inquiries into the beliefs of prospective wit-
nesses, but it did not forbid imposing a civil disability on individuals
whose beliefs were publicly known.280
As equality became “a staple in American political rhetoric,”281 how-
ever, opponents of existing evidence rules increasingly insisted that gov-
ernmental discrimination in civil privileges on the basis of religious
beliefs was unconstitutional. At first, reform arguments remained tethered
to an older view of free exercise, positing that religious practice would be
burdened only when individuals were deprived of civil privileges on
account of their faith. But as time passed, free-exercise arguments
279. See, for example, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 877–79 (1990); see also Michael W. McConnell, “Neutrality Under the
Religion Clauses,” Northwestern University Law Review 81 (1986): 146–67.
280. For evidence of this view in other nineteenth-century free-exercise controversies, see
Campbell, “Religious Neutrality,” 333–47. For earlier debates about religious freedom and
equality of civil privileges, see Hamburger, “Equality and Diversity,” 295–392.
281. William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial
Doctrine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 14. See also Howard Gillman,
The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers
Jurisprudence (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993): 29 (courts in Jacksonian era
began “to emphasize the illegitimacy of so-called unequal, partial, class, or special legisla-
tion; that is, legislation which advanced the interests of only a part of the community”).
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transitioned into freestanding attacks on any discrimination among reli-
gious groups, without regard to the effect of testimonial exclusion on
particular adherents. By the outset of the Civil War, many jurists viewed
witness incompetency as akin to punishment: a government-imposed
stigma with tangible and symbolic consequences for the excluded
groups.282
In this way, religion-based competency reforms helped pave the way for
removals of other competency rules.283 Put simply, evidence rules came to
have newfound social and political meaning. In earlier judicial discussions
of competency rules, parties were the sole bearers of courtroom rights, and
witnesses were merely cogs in the judicial process.284 Judges had occa-
sionally mentioned witness interests, or stated that being eligible to testify
was “one of the distinguishing rights of a free citizen,” but even these
sporadic comments did not describe a constitutional right that reigned
supreme over existing evidentiary rules.285 In contemporary parlance, the
language of “civil rights” usually referred to all legal rights and privileges,
and not merely those placed beyond legislative reach.286
The notion that certain groups could be excluded from testifying, how-
ever, took on far greater social and legal importance in the second quarter
of the nineteenth century. And this shift was soon manifest beyond
religion-based competency debates. In 1840, for example, a brief political
firestorm erupted when a court martial in Florida allowed several black
Navy stewards to testify against a white lieutenant named George
M. Hooe. “In all the States of our Union there is a marked distinction,
in legal and political rights, between the free white person and the free col-
ored person of African blood,” Hooe protested, “and in all they are of
282. See, for example, Committee on Slavery and the Treatment of Freedmen, “To Secure
Equality Before the Law in Courts of the United States,” S. Rep. No. 99 (February 29, 1864),
in The Reports of Committees of the Senate of the United States, for the First Session of the
Thirty-Eighth Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1864), 12 (describ-
ing exclusions founded on race as “something more than a rule of evidence, from which jus-
tice may suffer,” finding their “most perfect parallel” in the Indian caste system, and
decrying their use as “despoil[ing] the colored person of his right to testify”); see also
Green, “The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause,” 68.
283. See, for example, Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 837 (1864) (remarks
of Senator Collamer) (arguing that liberal reforms with respect to religion-based competency
rules militated in favor of broader competency reforms).
284. See, for example, notes 161 and 162.
285. Den v. Vancleve, 5 N.J.L. (2 South.) 652 (1819) (noting that the “personal privilege”
or “right” of being a witness did not overcome the “want of religious principle and belief, as
in the case of those who do not believe in the being, perfections and providence of God, nor
in a future state of rewards and punishments”).
286. See Hamburger, “Equality and Diversity,” 229 n.9.
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inferior rank and condition in society.” Even where free blacks were
“viewed in the light of citizens,” he continued, “they are still a degraded
class, by the many disabilities which the laws of those States have pro-
scribed.”287 Northerners sometimes harnessed the same rhetoric to support
the opposite agenda. In the 1846 Constitutional Convention in New York,
for example, a delegate argued that making all atheists incompetent to tes-
tify “was analagous [sic] to a custom in certain parts of this country, where
testimony was excluded because the witness was a man of color or a
slave.”288 Similar comparisons appeared in the Congressional debates in
the 1860s when Charles Sumner, among others, sought to eliminate race-
based competency rules in federal courts.289
The nineteenth-century breakdown in religion-based competency rules
further illuminates a crucial but largely unexplored transition in the history
of evidence law. Scholars have highlighted the early nineteenth-century
writings of, among others, Jeremy Bentham and John Appleton, who advo-
cated for wide-ranging evidentiary reform.290 They have also given consid-
erable attention to the flurry of statutes in the 1850s and 1860s allowing
civil parties and criminal defendants to testify.291 But scholars have yet
to study how shifting ideas about jury capacity facilitated efforts to reform
competency rules from the 1820s through the 1840s.
Untangling the causes of religion-based competency liberalization is
tricky. Theological developments, combined with changing notions of reli-
gious liberty, seem to have triggered the first wave of reform, although
many reformers were also concerned that excluding evidence would
improperly skew the outcomes of cases. These legal developments did
287. House Documents, Otherwise Published as Executive Documents: 13th Congress,
26th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 7, no. 244, 45. For discussions of race-based incompetency
rules, see Ariela J. Gross, Double Character: Slavery and Mastery in the Antebellum
Southern Courtroom (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 61–66; and
Thomas D. Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law, 1619–1860 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1996), 229–48.
288. See note 240.
289. See note 282.
290. See, for example, Witt, “Making the Fifth,” 864–65; and Twining, Rethinking
Evidence, 41–45, 54–55. Having completed the research for this article, I still have very little
appreciation for how much Appleton, Bentham, or others, such as Edward Livingston, influ-
enced the American reform effort. John Witt argues that “Bentham’s role appears to have
been to supply a rhetoric that could be put to use in promoting an independently existing
opposition to the disqualification rules.” Witt, “Making the Fifth,” 865. That may be
right, but my view is that we do not have enough information to know whether evidentiary
reform in America would have been any different without Bentham and his followers.
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not depend on arguments about the jury being uniquely competent to eval-
uate evidence. In fact, legislative efforts in the 1820s and early 1830s often
focused on excluding any evidence of witnesses’ religious views, even if
directed at their credibility. Some legislators were openly skeptical that
juries could fairly evaluate such evidence.292
Reform efforts in the 1830s and 1840s, however, are more difficult to
assess. Apparently learning from their earlier failures, reformers argued
that rejecting atheists was counterproductive because juries were capable
of evaluating witness veracity. Framing the debate in these terms was pru-
dent; reformers were far more persuasive when emphasizing juror capacity
rather than atheist truthfulness. At the same time, however, the success of
the jury-oriented rhetoric may indicate broader public support for jury fact
finding, setting the groundwork for the rhetorical strategy employed in the
later movements in the 1850s and 1860s that successfully extended evi-
dence liberalization to other excluded groups.293 After all, Charles
Sumner’s Senate committee reported in 1864, “testimony is submitted to
the scrutiny of a jury” and could “have no effect whatever except through
the assent of their judgment.”294
By the middle of the nineteenth century, countless Americans were con-
testing the religious principles that President Washington had declared
essential to a well-ordered legal system. Yet the United States had avoided
the godless pandemonium of revolutionary France that Washington so
feared. Instead, judges and politicians accounted for theological changes
by redrawing evidentiary rules. And in doing so, they harnessed novel
understandings of free exercise, civil rights, and the role of juries that con-
tinue to shape American law.
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of Senator Wilkinson) (“Leave that to the jury. . . . “[L]et the jury and court determine as to
the credibility of the witness”); and “To Secure Equality Before the Law,” 11 (“[T]he plain
tendency of recent legislation, and also of judicial decisions in England and in the United
States, has been to limit objections to the capacity of witnesses, and to allow the court
and jury on hearing their testimony to estimate its weight and value”).
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